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*The Department of State*

# bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 880

May 7, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## The Institutionalizing of Peace

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

It is a conspicuous honor to address this 50th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law. The first meeting was addressed by the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, the initial president of your society. Mr. Root possessed one of the finest legal minds this country or any other country has ever known, and he made outstanding contributions to the development of international law. Two of the original vice presidents of the society were former Secretaries of State—John W. Foster, my grandfather, and Richard Olney. That tradition of close association of the society with the Department of State has been continuous. It is due to that tradition that I am today an honorary president of your society and afforded the opportunity of speaking on this important anniversary.

Before coming here, I reread Secretary Root's address and I was struck by the way in which history repeats itself. That address discussed authoritatively the treaty-making power and concretely the relation of that power to a State law which seemed to violate our treaty of 1894 with Japan. Today we are still discussing the treaty-making power, and much the same issue that Mr. Root discussed is raised by recent State laws which seem to contravene our 1953 treaty with Japan.

Secretary Root concluded his address with a powerful plea for a spirit of international friendship and treaty observance without which, he said, "there can never be a world of peace."

I turn now to the broad problem of achieving the "world of peace" of which Secretary Root spoke. That problem today overshadows all other

problems, because the instruments of war have become so powerful that their full use would destroy vast segments of the human race.

It is particularly fitting that this problem should be considered in this society of international lawyers, because the problem will never be solved without the help of those members of the legal profession who are also students of international affairs. Lawyers have always had a special aptitude in the formulation of political institutions; and that is an art which is demanded at this juncture in world affairs. Peace should not depend upon the winds of emotion being friendly and fair; or upon the deterrent of fear; or upon the skills and improvisations of diplomacy. Now, as never before, peace must be solid, and to be solid it needs to be an institution.

Until recent years it has been war, not peace, that has been an institution. It has been the means whereby international change has been effected. Not only has war been lawful, but the concept of the "just war" has been deeply rooted in our moral and political code.

By the latter part of the 19th century, statesmen began to take note of the heavy economic burden of armament and of the increasing destruction that could be wrought by armament. This led to the calling of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. These conferences did not, however, attempt to abolish or replace the war system. Rather they sought to assure that war would continue to be a tolerable institution. It was sought that war should interfere as little as possible with the lives and with the businesses of civilians; that private property should be immune from seizure in time of war; that blockade should be used only in exceptional circumstances; that contraband be limited so that peaceful trade could

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 50th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 25 (press release 216).

go on; and to "prohibit the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons."

Mr. Foster attended the second Hague Peace Conference, and through him I became one of the junior secretaries of the conference. I well remember those days, and particularly the debate which took place between various of the delegations as to whether or not humanizing war tended to reduce resort to war. I recall that it was then the German delegation that held the thesis which reappears today—that peace is more apt to prevail if war is terrible, because then all will avoid it.

You may recall that a third Hague conference was planned for 1914. But World War I came instead. At its close, an exhausted world sought for the first time to institutionalize peace.

### **The League Effort**

The League of Nations was designed to establish, at least in rudimentary form, those institutional elements which enable mature democratic societies to preserve order and observe justice.

In the national state, order is maintained and violence is prevented primarily (1) by laws, written or unwritten, which reflect the moral judgment of the community subject thereto; (2) by political machinery to change these laws from time to time so that, as conditions change, laws will continue to meet the test of justice and not perpetuate obsolete concepts; (3) by an executive body to administer law; (4) by courts which settle disputes of a justiciable character in accordance with law; (5) by superior public force which deters violence by its ability to apprehend and punish adequately any who breach or defy the law; and (6) by a state of public well-being sufficient so that the people heed the dictates of reason and of prudence and are not driven by a sense of desperation to follow ways of violence.

The League of Nations had, in its Assembly, the rough equivalent of a broadly based legislative body, but requiring unanimity for most action. That Assembly was authorized to advise a reconsideration of treaties which might become inapplicable and of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace. The Council and the Secretariat of the League represented a form of executive power. There was a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear and settle international disputes. A measure of police power was to be found in the provisions for

sanctions to be applied in the case of illegal resort to war. There was a call for "equitable treatment for commerce."

### **The Pact of Paris**

The United States, although it largely inspired this effort to institutionalize peace, did not join it. We initiated another project which superficially seemed easier and simpler—that was to abolish war. By the Pact of Paris of 1928 over 60 nations of the world, including all the great powers, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed to settle all disputes or conflicts by pacific means.

This pact marks a milestone in history in that for the first time war was made illegal. But also that pact demonstrated the futility of attempting, merely by the stroke of a pen, to abolish an institution as deeply rooted as the war system, when no adequate compensating institutions were brought into being to replace it.

In an effort to put "teeth" into the Pact of Paris, Secretary Stimson in 1932 proposed the doctrine of nonrecognition of "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928." But aggressors continued to find the fruits of their aggression to be quite palatable, even though others denied their right to such enjoyment.

### **Limitation of Armament**

Another field of endeavor during the interwar period was that of the limitation of armament. It was argued that, since modern war cannot be waged without armament, the likelihood of war is reduced as armaments are reduced. Guided by that simple proposition, the victors of World War I sought first of all to disarm and keep disarmed the defeated nations. At the same time they kept up a search of ways and means to lessen armaments for everyone. The League of Nations was active in the field of disarmament, with the United States participating in certain phases of its work. In addition, there were efforts at naval disarmament undertaken largely on the initiative of the United States. There resulted a certain measure of agreement among the leading naval powers on limitations of specific categories of ships. But the broader problems of disarmament proved baffling.



## The United Nations

All of these efforts became engulfed by World War II. When that war was nearing its end, 51 nations gathered at San Francisco in a new effort to institutionalize peace so as to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

The pattern of this new effort followed the pattern of effort after the First World War. The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, and the covenant by the charter. There is, as under the League, a Council and an Assembly. The Permanent Court of International Justice is replaced by the International Court of Justice. This time the renunciation of war, which was found in the Pact of Paris but not in the League Covenant, is in substance written into the charter of the United Nations (article 2 (4)). The quasi-legislative function, which was embodied in the authority of the League's Assembly to consider the revision of treaties and international conditions, is replaced by articles 13 and 14 of the charter which, among other things, call for "the progressive development of international law and its codification" and which authorize the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." The charter makes limitation of armament a goal, as did the Treaty of Versailles.

Of course, no constitution is self-executing. The League provisions were inadequately implemented. We may properly and usefully ask: How well are the charter provisions being implemented?

## The Development of International Law

First of all, there is the problem of law. The charter itself establishes some basic international law, notably by article 2, which deals with sovereign equality, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force. Chapter XI, dealing with non-self-governing territories, also contains an important enunciation of legal principle.

Article 13, as we have noted, calls for "development of international law and its codification." Under this provision the General Assembly has established the International Law Commission, which has since 1949 met annually to carry out this provision of the charter. Much useful work

has been accomplished by the Commission. But progress in incorporating its proposals into the body of international law has so far been minimal.

There is, as you well know, a considerable body of so-called treaty law, represented by treaties as between the nations. But not all treaties represent "law" in the sense we here use the term. Some treaties are multilateral and prescribe agreed rules of conduct in relation to such matters as the treatment of aliens and international trade. Other treaties, usually bilateral, represent merely bargains and are not law in the sense of being a rule of conduct formulated in response to a community sentiment. They are somewhat the counterpart of private contracts within a national society. There has occurred a healthy growth in the multilateral, lawmaking type of treaty.

There is also a body of world opinion which, when it is crystallized and brought to bear on particular situations, plays a role equivalent to our "common law." There has been gratifying progress in developing this kind of community judgment, and the gatherings of the nations at the General Assembly of the United Nations greatly promote this result. There international conduct is judged, sometimes formally but more often informally; and even the most powerful nations feel it expedient to be able to represent their conduct as conforming to this body of world opinion.

While there is good progress, it must be admitted that the total of international law still falls far short of what is needed to institutionalize peace.

## Peaceful Change

Then there is the matter of peaceful means to effect international change. We have referred to article 14 of the charter, which authorizes the General Assembly to recommend change. Of course, power to *recommend* change is considerably less than power to *enact* change. Nevertheless, the power to recommend, when exercised in a responsible way by a great majority of the nations of the world, is a considerable power, and many Assembly recommendations have been transformed into fact.

It must, however, be recognized that debates in the General Assembly in relation to resolutions calling for change tend to be emotional, and votes are sometimes cast not on the basis of impartial study and judgment of the facts but rather on the basis of the political alinement of the members

and sometimes on the basis of what one might refer to as international "logrolling." Sometimes Assembly debate is counterproductive and makes change less likely because it arouses nationalistic sentiments. Indeed, it sometimes seems that world opinion is more powerful when it is sensed than when the United Nations tries to formulate it in an Assembly resolution.

There are vast potentialities in article 14, but these potentialities are not yet sufficiently well developed so that peaceful change is a well-ordered function of the Assembly.

#### **Change to and From Independence**

World opinion bears particularly upon the conduct of those peoples who, in the words of our Declaration of Independence, feel they owe "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It is largely through this force, which found expression in chapter XI of the charter, that there has occurred the greatest peaceful evolution that history has ever known. During the 11 years since World War II ended and the United Nations Charter came into force, over 650 million people have gained a new political independence, now represented by 18 newly sovereign nations. Other non-self-governing peoples are at the threshold of independence.

It is highly encouraging that these vast changes should have come about peacefully. It demonstrates dramatically that a very large measure of peaceful change is possible. But also we must record the fact that these changes only took place within the free nations and that elsewhere there has been an obstinate resistance to the moral pressure for change toward independence and self-government.

There is not, in the world as a whole, any adequate assurance of peaceful change.

#### **Enforcement of Law and Order**

Let us turn now to the problem of the administration and enforcement of law. We have in the United Nations Security Council a body which, by the charter, is given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The charter contemplates (article 43) that the Security Council shall have at its disposal armed forces necessary for maintaining peace.

Unfortunately, the charter scheme for a Security Council action backed by an international

police force has, up to now, not been realized because of the so-called veto power. Thereby confidence in the Security Council has been badly shaken and its usefulness impaired.

In an effort to meet that situation the General Assembly adopted in 1950 a resolution known as "Uniting for Peace." It asked the members voluntarily to hold in readiness armed contingents available for United Nations use in maintaining international peace and security. Also the Assembly set up a procedure for meeting on 24 hours' notice in the event of a threat to the peace and a paralysis of the Security Council through exercise of the veto power.

This partially compensates for the undependability of the Security Council as a law enforcement body. However, the General Assembly is primarily a deliberative body and includes so many members that it cannot serve effectively as an executive or enforcement agency.

As further moves to reinforce the processes for peace, 45 nations have joined in collective security arrangements under article 51 of the charter, which acknowledges the inherent right of collective self-defense against armed attack. Most of these collective security arrangements are backed by the mobile striking power of the United States. These arrangements go far to deny aggressors the opportunity to follow the typical pattern of aggression which consists of picking up weaker nations one by one.

#### **The Judicial Process**

Let us turn now to the judicial process. Here we find that, despite much lipservice to that process, most nations prefer to seek the settlement of their disputes by diplomatic means, or perhaps they prefer to keep the disputes open for domestic political reasons. In the 10 years since the new International Court of Justice has been in being, there have been 21 contentious cases brought before the Court. There have been only 9 judgments on the merits; 2 cases are pending; and the remaining 10 have been disposed of without a decision, principally because the respondent has denied jurisdiction and refused to appear. During the same period of time there have been 8 advisory opinions delivered, and 2 requests for advisory opinions are pending. This post-World War II record, as far as contentious cases are concerned, approximates the record of the Per-

manent Court of International Justice, which sat for 23 years between the First and Second World Wars and dealt with 22 cases on the merits. However, relatively more advisory opinions were rendered by the Permanent Court.

It is significant that, with all the disputes which exist in the world, there are only two contentious cases now on the docket of the International Court of Justice. It is demonstrated that nations are reluctant to settle serious disputes on the basis of rules of law.

### **Economic Well-Being**

There remains to consider the conditions of human welfare.

On the whole there has been a vast improvement in economic conditions throughout the world during the first postwar decade. Much of this is due to the fact that the economically mature states have practiced an enlightened self-interest whereby they have assisted others and have encouraged multilateral trade on a most-favored-nation basis. Thirty-five nations work through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to promote world trade on a multilateral basis. The United Nations has economic commissions for Europe, Asia, and South America.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that all of this effort rests upon a fragile international basis. It is open to the nations to escape from their present tariffs and to create obstacles which would seriously interfere with world trade and gravely disrupt the economic life of many countries.

The danger of this is increased by the fact that the domestic impact of imports is always plain and identifiable and the role of such imports in paying for exports is not so readily apparent. World economy is in no sense organized to a point where any one nation can feel that the welfare of its people is free from grave hazard at the will of other nations.

### **The Present Inadequacy**

If one were to summarize the present state of affairs, it could permissibly be concluded that considerable progress, even unprecedented progress, has been made in some of the essentials of an international order. There is more international law than ever before. There are greater enforcement possibilities than ever before, particularly in terms

of deterrence to open armed aggression. There is more peaceful change than ever before.

But even if we recognize, as we gladly do, that international society is moving in a sound direction, we must, I think, seriously ask ourselves whether we have adequately learned, and are with sufficient rapidity applying, the lessons of history. Humanity survived through World War II, despite the failure after World War I. But we cannot be sure that we shall be given a second reprieve. The new nature of warfare, as exemplified by the atomic bomb which burst upon a startled world just after the United Nations Charter was signed, gave notice that there may not be an amplitude of time with which to seek progress by the timid route of pragmatic trial and error.

### **The Need for More International Law**

The foregoing analysis suggests that there are certain areas which particularly require development at the present time.

One such area is the field of international law. There needs to be a greater and more significant body of such law. Popular attention tends to focus upon the police functions of an international order. These are more spectacular than law itself. But law is absolutely essential to prevent despotism. A policeman must know whom he is to apprehend and why, and a citizen must know when he can count upon the policeman to protect him and when he must fear arrest. Without law a policeman, whatever uniform he wears, is a despot or a tool of despotism.

This necessity for law creates a perplexing problem because so much of the world is ruled by those who do not believe in law in our sense of the word. "Law," within the Communist bloc, is considered the means whereby those in power maintain their power and destroy their enemies. Since communism is materialistic and atheistic, its leaders cannot accept the view that law represents man's efforts to apply to human affairs principles of justice which derive from a higher being. For them there is no natural or moral law. Neither can they understand the concept of rulers being themselves subject to law since, by their creed, the rulers are themselves the source of law.

Nevertheless, there is some glimmering of hope in this respect. Recent developments within the Soviet Union indicate an effort to provide greater personal security than existed when everyone was

subject to liquidation through the secret police at the will of an enemy who possessed the greater power. Vyshinsky's code of "trial by confession" rather than by evidence is being repudiated. So, despite the Communist doctrinal rejection of our concept of law, there may be emerging a de facto acceptance of law as a protection of the individual against the capricious will of those in authority.

It is also a fact that on the international plane the Soviet rulers, if only grudgingly and as a matter of expediency, take some account of the opinions of mankind. And these, as we have observed, can form a body of common or unwritten international law.

Therefore, it is not hopeless to seek to develop a greater body of law even on a universal basis.

In view, however, of the great difficulty of gaining multilateral acceptance of formal codifications of international law, we shall have to place much reliance upon unwritten law. This, in turn, requires constant education of public opinion, so that it will reflect a sound judgment about international conduct. There needs also to be improvement of the processes of the United Nations General Assembly so that, when it acts in a quasi-legislative or judicial capacity, it will comply with such high standards as evoked the Anglo-Saxon concept of the King's conscience which the Equity Chancellor was to apply.

There can also be a useful development of law among the free-world nations as a whole and also among those groups of free nations as naturally draw together. The Organization of American States has already done much to develop a body of American law and precedent which helps to keep peace and order in the new world.

#### **The Need for More Peaceful Change**

When we consider the question of law, we must always consider it jointly with the problem of peaceful change. Law does not conduce to peace if it merely perpetuates the status quo after that status has ceased to serve the needs of a vital and changing community. So far, force or the threat of force has been by far the most effective means of bringing about change. If force is to be eradicated, adequate means for peaceful change must exist. While, as we have seen, peaceful change has already occurred to an unprecedented degree in the evolution of subject peoples to independence, there still remains danger of war from efforts to perpet-

uate situations which by any standard of equity ought to be changed.

This makes it of the utmost importance that nations be responsive to informed world opinion and that the "peaceful adjustment" article of the United Nations Charter (article 14) should be put to better use.

#### **The Stabilization of International Trade**

Another area which needs concentrated attention is the area of international trade. There is often a lack of appreciation of the close relationship which exists between international trade and the problem of war or peace. That relationship seems better understood by Soviet political students. They consider that the vicissitudes of trade under the capitalistic system are its greatest weakness and provide them with their best chance to overthrow that system.

The last important publication of Stalin before he died<sup>2</sup> argued that war between the Communist world and the capitalistic world might not be inevitable because the capitalistic world would almost surely war within itself. This, Stalin contended, would take place as a result of the quarrels which would develop out of the need of the industrial countries of the West to find markets for their goods, given the addition of Germany and Japan as major industrial producers and the subtraction of the Soviet-Chinese Communist world as free markets for the West.

One of the most recent and authoritative Soviet Communist publications is that brought out in 1954 under the title of *Political Economy*.<sup>3</sup> It deals thoroughly with the relationship of trade to international relations and the issues of war and peace.

When we think of the causes of the Second World War, we tend to identify them with the personalities of Hitler and the Japanese war lords. But we would do well to go behind them to the economic condition that brought Hitler and the Japanese war lords into power in the early 1930's. Edmond Vermeil, an outstanding French student of Germany, in his book, *Germany's Three Reichs*, said that the economic crisis "suffices in itself to

<sup>2</sup> *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (Oct. 30, 1952).

<sup>3</sup> Textbook published by the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R. (1954).



explain the final triumph of Hitlerism in 1930." John Wheeler-Bennett, outstanding British historian, in his book, *Munich—Prologue to Tragedy*, wrote, "The forces of nationalism . . . revived with renewed vigor under the influence of economic disaster." And G. C. Allen of the University of London, writing in the book, *The Industrialization of Japan*, said, "The sufferings incidental to the depression brought discredit on the [liberal] government"; and Hugh Borton of Columbia University in his book on *Japan*, speaking of the Japanese Premier's efforts in 1931 to keep the war lords under control, wrote, "Unfortunately for him and for liberalism in Japan, he came to power just when the world depression struck Japan. . . . The cry of the militarists that Japan's economic ills could be cured only by direct action in China and by the exploitation of Manchuria fell on sympathetic ears."

As we pointed out, economic conditions since World War II have, on the whole, been sound within the free world and there has been a definite rising of standards of living. But there seems as yet no adequate popular or even political realization of how vital it is for peace that this trend should continue.

Any serious interruption of international trade could readily again bring reckless men to power in hard-hit countries, demanding for their countries the resources and markets needed for economic well-being. This could precipitate world war III.

We have noted the need for peaceful change. Of all forms of change, that of national boundaries is the most difficult to effect peacefully. But the need for change of boundaries becomes less if boundaries are not barriers to the reasonable flow of trade and movement of persons and ideas. The more boundaries are barriers, the more need there is to change them and the more difficult it is to accomplish the peaceful change which is the only alternative to violent change.

#### Armament as Community Power

I have left to the last the problem of armament. This is in some ways the most important and in many ways the most complex of the components of institutionalized peace.

There exists today, primarily in the possession of the Soviet Union and the United States, vast power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

However, these two nations do not possess a monopoly. The United Kingdom also is developing nuclear weapons. And as atomic energy becomes used for peacetime purposes, others will have opportunity to get the weapons material which is a byproduct of the production of nuclear power.

Nations are working today on several fronts in an effort to bring nuclear power under international control. There is the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations, now negotiating at London, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in process of formation pursuant to President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal of 1953.

The task of controlling atomic power to exclude the possibility of diversion to military use of the byproduct material is, however, very difficult. Science has yet to devise means to assure effective supervision, control, and accounting for byproduct fissionable material.

I do not intend to go into the highly complicated problem of general limitation of armament, a problem found insoluble after World War I. Here, I think, we must rely, in part at least, upon a lessening of political tensions and such reciprocal fear-dispelling knowledge as could result from President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan. If it be possible to create an atmosphere free of fear, that will facilitate arms limitation because nations will no longer feel it necessary or expedient to spend vast sums upon their armament. Indeed, under these conditions, it would be practically impossible to prevent substantial reductions of armaments.

There is, however, one aspect of the matter which I would touch upon tonight. That is the relationship between the powerful new weapons and the establishment of an effective international force to deter and, if need be, punish violations of international law.

How will it be possible to make community power superior to that of the lawbreaker if individual nations possess atomic and nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery?

The answer, it seems, must be found in growing recognition that destructive power such as that now represented by atomic and nuclear weapons is so great a power that it is clothed with a public and community interest. Such power ought never to be the tool of any single nation, to promote its national objectives or to permit it to defy community law and order. Unless that concept

is accepted, it is impossible for peace ever to become a stable and dependable institution.

The United States has already made clear its own purpose never to use the vast new power which comes from new weapons and new means of delivery except in the defense of principles which the whole world accepts. These principles are established by the charter of the United Nations, which requires that "nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force," and which also recognizes that nations have an "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" as against armed attack.

It is generally accepted by the free-world peoples that the United States means what it says in these respects. They believe it not merely because we say it but because what we say conforms to the traditions of our Nation and to the moral principles which our people and their government generally espouse.

The same cannot be said of the Soviet Union, where power is despotic and exercised by those who deny the existence of moral law or of principles superior to the self-interest of the dictators. Nevertheless, the time must come when the Soviet rulers, if only as a matter of expediency and in deference to what should be incessant demands of world opinion, will be prepared to take steps to assure that the new power of modern weapons is in fact subjected to the will of the community.

It may seem that this prospect is remote. But when we consider the many startling changes which from time to time have occurred within the Soviet Union, we need not regard this particular prospect as wholly visionary.

In the meantime, and in order that we may set an example which will be influential, the United States itself, I suggest, should increasingly make clear, by word and deed, through the United Nations and through collective-defense associations to which we belong, that it is our intent that this new power be used only in defense of principles to which the community of nations subscribes.

Paragraph 5 of the Vandenberg Resolution (1948) called for progress along two fronts, "maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces" and also "agreement . . . upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments" of member nations. Progress along these two lines, building community power and diminishing purely national

power, is necessary to the establishment of international law and order.

### **The Task Is Imperative**

When we review the task of making peace a stable institution through processes of law and justice, and enforcement thereof, it is easy to become discouraged. We must not, however, admit of discouragement, because the task is much too important. The fact that the task is difficult, and that the road to the goal may be long, is a reason not for delay or for despair but rather for greater urgency and for greater effort.

There is much to be done and much that can be promptly done. Where universality may not be practical, we can find in regional and collective-defense associations an area where notable progress can be made. These associations can serve as important steppingstones toward a universal order. They can, as between their own members, develop such principles of conduct as we have referred to, and they can make force into a sanction for these principles, thus making it serve the community.

The essential thing is not that the ultimate goal be immediately reached but that the peoples of the world demonstrate the vision and the capacity to move steadily and hopefully toward that goal. The spectacle of men working together in fellowship on great tasks of creation is itself a powerful influence for peace and order. That activity deters the unruly from seeking by violence to interrupt a process which carries with it the hopes of all mankind.

We need not assume that we are set to run a hopeless race with time. We can gain time by intermediate efforts such as I describe. Also, what may seem to be far away today may be reached much more quickly than we might suppose. There has been a great evolution in thinking in the last three decades. Already there is progress such as the world has never known before. Also, never before was there such an awareness of the need as now flows from a knowledge of the nuclear menace. Whereas, in the past, it seemed reckless to take chances for peace, today it is reckless not to do so.

We must assume, as our working hypothesis, that what is necessary is possible. And we must prove it so.

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 212 dated April 24

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of interest and speculation on your remarks in New York yesterday about expanding the operation or purpose of NATO.<sup>1</sup> This interest has been increased by the fact that in this conference several weeks ago you talked rather negatively about what can be done. Will you give us some of your further ideas on this subject?*

A. I do not feel that I can properly at this time fill in very much what I said yesterday. Broadly speaking, it is our view, and I think has been our view, that an organization of this kind either grows or tends to dry up. And we believe that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ought to be in the class of organizations which grow rather than those which dry up because they only were designed to serve a limited purpose which may in due course be fulfilled.

As I indicated yesterday, I believe that there is a basis for continuing vitality in the Atlantic community comparable to that which brought into being the Pan American Union and the Organization of American States, which have been in existence for over 66 years and which will go on, I guess, for a great many more years.

Now, I do not think that there was an inconsistency in what I said yesterday with what I said in my earlier press conference.<sup>2</sup> I did say at that earlier press conference that I felt that certain types of activity in relation to economic trade as between the members of NATO could perhaps be better carried on through the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], which includes in the main the members of NATO and also one or two other countries who are not members of NATO. But I did not intend in that particular remark, which I still stand by, to indicate that there was no opportunity for the growth and vitality of NATO.

Now, I don't want to discuss the details because we are only one of 15 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This matter will undoubtedly be discussed rather actively next

week in Paris, and I think that it is appropriate that we should have an exchange of views around the Council table with our partners and learn more of their views before we attempt to refine and define our own.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, NATO is essentially operated as a military organization. It would appear that political and economic possibilities are the only other two. Are you thinking more, broadly speaking, in the economic or the political line in your latest remarks?*

A. Well, I would say we are thinking on both.

*Q. But you do feel that OEEC is the more proper way to handle economic matters?*

A. Economic matters as within Europe. But there are also economic problems which could conceivably relate to activities between NATO countries, or some of them, and non-European countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the United States Government plans to take to the next NATO meeting any specific plans or proposals for expansion or development of NATO or whether we are just going with an open mind on the matter?*

A. Well, we will go with some thoughts to exchange, yes. I may say that the general concept of my speech was discussed with the permanent representatives at Paris, who make up the NATO permanent Council there, about a week ago, before I made my speech, because I wanted to be sure there would be a general receptivity to that point of view, and I found that there was.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you thinking of the kind of political development of the organization, for example, that might make it possible, for instance, to consider such problems as Cyprus, and so on?*

A. Well, now you're pinning me down a little bit more closely than I care for.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you said economic questions and non-European countries, had you in mind underdeveloped areas which might be assisted by NATO or areas such as the Middle East upon which NATO is dependent for its fuel?*

A. I would think that both of those aspects of the matter should be considered. Whether there is agreement to deal with them or not I wouldn't

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

<sup>2</sup> For transcript of Feb. 28 press conference, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409.

know. But I think probably they should be discussed. It is certainly relevant, I would think, to the Atlantic community and to NATO that much of its economy depends upon oil that comes from the Middle East and if that was cut off you would be cutting off an element upon which NATO is very dependent as a military organization. That is one aspect of the matter.

There are also possibilities of joint efforts which might include all or some of the NATO countries to assist in neighboring areas such as North Africa. The French have made proposals along that line. I don't want to imply that those proposals would be acceptable, but I merely mention them as indicating the possible range of thinking.

#### **NATO and OAS**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in general terms when you point out OAS as an organization which NATO may grow to be like, do you have in mind agencies like the Inter-American Peace Commission, which deals with regional disputes, and the Economic and Social Council?*

A. Well, again, I prefer not to go into that at this time. I would say this: I do not suggest that there should be any exact patterning of NATO to correspond with the Organization of American States. I was careful in my remarks yesterday to say, after speaking of the Organization of American States, that NATO or the Atlantic community might grow in its own distinctive way. I used the word "distinctive" for the very purpose of indicating that it would not necessarily be exactly the same pattern.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the characteristics of the Organization of American States in this hemisphere has been within the limit of the area and its universality. Do you anticipate any change in the basic character of NATO which would make it have appeal to all the non-Communist countries in the European area? I mean such countries, specifically, as Switzerland and Sweden.*

A. Well, I do not contemplate the membership of such countries in NATO because NATO is a defensive military alliance. Its military activities are major and for some time probably will be a major phase of its activities, and in view of the neutral status which those countries have elected to take I could hardly expect that they would actually join NATO.

*Q. How about Spain? Do you envisage Spain as being a partner?*

A. Well, as far as the United States is concerned, we would be very happy to see Spain a member of NATO. And if the broadening of NATO activities makes that easier, that would, from our standpoint, be one of the good byproducts of it. But, of course, there is some difference of opinion within NATO about Spain, and we are not trying to press our views, or force our views, upon other countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why there is a feeling among NATO countries today that there is a danger of its drying up?*

A. I don't think I said that they felt that there was a danger of its drying up. What I said referred to a law of nature that it is inevitable that things either grow or they do tend to dry up. And an organization which is created to meet an emergency or a special situation tends to diminish in vigor as it is judged that the occasion for its coming into being disappears.

Now, then, the question is, do we consider NATO as an organization which was created and which has its life only for the duration of the threat that brought it into being? If so, you do not look ahead through long vistas of time. Or you consider that NATO is an organization which reflects the spirit of Western civilization, which has been a great and vital factor in the world for a great many years but the efficacy of which, as I pointed out in my speech, has been greatly diminished by the disunity as between its members. A great task of postwar statesmanship is to heal the disunities which in the past have so often been the cause of war. We have had wars which have come out of the West almost every generation for a good many years.

Now, a great deal has already been done to heal that breach—through bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO; through the Brussels Treaty, which now creates what is called Western European Union. But if the divisions of Western Europe are healed by organizations which themselves are looked upon as emergency and temporary organizations, then you have not got the element for a permanent healing of those divisions and the creation of unity. So I think it is important, from the standpoint of the long-range future of Europe and the avoidance of



what has in the past been a frequent cause of war, that the things that tie together the countries of Western Europe have the quality of permanency and not be merely emergency ties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good deal of criticism at home and abroad to the effect that our approach to world affairs has been over-militarized. Could it be that your speech yesterday indicates that you are at least exploring the possibility of a different emphasis without sacrificing the military—that you're thinking of increasing the accent on the economic and political approach?*

A. I think that that would be a fair interpretation of what the President said on Saturday<sup>3</sup> and what I said on Monday. In certain parts of the world, at least, it seems that the Soviet activities are putting less emphasis upon violent means and more emphasis upon other means. Perhaps that appraisal needs a little adjustment, in the light of Khrushchev's outburst in London yesterday. But in the main there is an effort to eliminate from their doctrine, and perhaps to some extent from their practice, the Stalin thesis that only violence would serve. As I perhaps have quoted or paraphrased here before, Stalin said that anybody who believed that communism, Soviet communism, can achieve its goal without resort to violence has either gone out of his mind or else does not understand the basic fundamentals of Communist philosophy. Well, now apparently they are trying to get away from that point of view, both doctrinally and to some extent, I believe, in practice. And it's necessary and appropriate that we should, I think, adapt our tactics to the changes in Soviet Communist tactics.

#### The Cold War

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, it was the consensus of a group of American newspaper editors in Washington last week that the United States is losing the cold war. On the same day, the President expressed the opinion that exactly the opposite was true. Can you spell out for us some of the ways in which we may be countering the cold war?*

A. Well, of course, when you approach the question of whether we are winning or losing the cold war, I suppose the first thing to determine is, what

do you mean by the "cold war"? As I tried to point out yesterday, the cold war is not simply a defensive operation. If by cold war you mean merely to keep alive hatred of Russia, or to keep the Russians permanently ostracized and to deny them any access to the free world, then I suppose it could be judged that we are not winning the cold war. But that is not my concept at all of what the cold war is.

The cold war basically is an effort, first of all, to do away with the great danger of hot war. I notice that the same people who said we were losing the cold war also agreed that there was very much less danger of war than there has been before. Well, if you call that losing, it's not my definition of losing. And we also, of course, primarily are looking to the day when Russia will be something that we can be friends with and not have to treat as enemies. And there has developed a beginning at least of a change within the Soviet Union. The change that has happened outside, which causes some to fear, is responsive to what the world judges has happened inside. It is widely judged, rightly or wrongly, but the fact is it is widely judged by responsible people, that the Soviet Union is not to be feared as much now as it was before. And if, in fact, the Soviet Union is not as much to be feared as it was, if it has become more tolerant, if it has put aside the use of violence, if it is beginning to move in a liberal way within, then I would call that progress toward victory in the cold war.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your last press conference<sup>4</sup> you pointed out that the fine print has to be read on the Moscow statement on the Middle East. I wonder if that reading of the fine print has been completed and you can give us your assessment of that statement.*

A. Yes, I can say I have now read the fine print and my impression is about the same as I expressed last week. It does seem to me that the statement is responsive to President Eisenhower's statement.<sup>5</sup> Now, when I say responsive to, I don't mean to say that it is in response to, which is slightly different. I don't mean to say that the Soviets made their statement because President Eisenhower made his statement. But the Soviet statement does, it seems to me, fit in with and

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 710.

<sup>5</sup> Issued at Augusta, Ga., on Apr. 9; see *ibid.*, Apr. 23, p. 668.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

in that sense is responsive to President Eisenhower's statement, which called upon all of the member nations to support the Hammarskjold mission and the efforts of the United Nations in this respect. And I think to the extent that the statement seems to commit the Soviet Union to the support of the Hammarskjold mission and to the handling of this matter in the United Nations, and we can hope a handling which would exclude its use of the veto power in the Security Council, that is all in the right direction.

#### Relations With the Philippines

*Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from the Philippines, including an AP dispatch, tell of the dissatisfaction with the prospective nominees for United States Ambassador there. Other reports tell of a rising anti-American sentiment. We are accused of treating the Philippines as an orphan. The New York Times recently described the situation as "serious, if not critical." The question is, do we give weight to Philippine public sentiment and its impact on friendly United States-Philippine relations in our diplomatic and other dealings with them?*

A. We attach the greatest of importance to good relations with the Philippines, and I believe that the relations at the present time are basically good, although I am not unaware of the fact that some are critical of the United States because they do not feel that we are cutting the Philippines in sufficiently upon our economic aid program.

When I was in Manila on my last trip, a month ago, I was quite aware of the criticism that was made in that respect. There was a good deal of attention paid to a chart which was drawn from a United States newspaper which, for example, showed a list of the countries that had received the greatest aid from the United States. The chart gave 10 countries, and the Philippines was last on that list. That was interpreted in some quarters as indicating that we were, as you put it, treating it as an "orphan." Well, the chart did not mean that. It picked the 10 countries that have gotten the most aid and merely lumped together the others, some 45, who had gotten less aid. The whole purport of the chart was to show that the Philippines was among the 10 who had gotten the most aid out of the approximately 50 who had

been aided. And even there the chart was inaccurate because it showed the total aid as approximately \$1 billion, whereas the actual amount of economic aid, including loans and U.S. expenditures in the Philippines, is about \$2.5 billion.

Also there is—very naturally, perhaps—misunderstanding as to the nature of our aid. We don't give foreign aid like a generous grandparent to his grandchildren on Christmas Day, who passes out checks to the favorite grandchildren and gives the biggest check to the one that he loves the most. This is a serious business—where we are trying to build up defenses against the dangers of Soviet communism. In Asia there is still a very considerable military danger, and the trend to renunciation of violence which I spoke of in relation to the Soviet Union is not fully apparent yet as far as Communist China is concerned. The great bulk of our aid in that part of the world is going to Korea, to Taiwan, and to Viet-Nam, which are three danger points. There are there actual wars suspended by armistices but not suspended by formal peace, and there is actual shooting going on sporadically around Taiwan. When we give help to those countries to hold back the military threat of the Chinese Communists, we are by that very fact helping the Philippines, which itself is in an exposed position. If we didn't help Korea, Taiwan, and Viet-Nam, as we are doing, the Philippines would be very much worse off. So that our program in those countries is also in aid of the Philippines. These things are not fully understood. We are trying to make them more clearly understood, because we greatly value Philippine friendship.

I think you made some reference at the beginning of your question to the acceptability of our new Ambassador.

*Q. Yes.*

A. Well, I understand that the *agrément* on him has been received.<sup>6</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, testimony before a congressional committee last week about the Soviet sailors who have gone back to the Soviet Union indicated that Mr. Sobolev and his associates of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations may have indulged in activities not necessarily consistent with his position as a United Nations representative*

<sup>6</sup> Albert F. Nufer was nominated to be Ambassador to the Philippines on Apr. 25.

here. *Does the State Department plan to protest action in that respect?*

A. Well, that depends upon what the facts develop to be. I understand that situation is being examined by the Department of Justice and the FBI. It falls within their jurisdiction, and I do not yet have any report. Of course, if the report justifies it, we would make protest. [See p. 765.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you made any investigation to find out why these five seamen went back to Russia?*

A. Well, that investigation is what is going on. But that investigation is conducted not by the State Department but by the Department of Justice.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in Russia, is there any evidence of any kind that the Russians are modifying their hold on the satellites?*

A. There is no evidence that they are voluntarily modifying their hold. I would say that there is a little evidence that their hold is getting somewhat weaker, not because they want it to be so but because the changes that have occurred in the Soviet policy have put a certain premium now upon Titoism. And while we think always in terms of the effect of Soviet policy in creating neutralism in the free-world camp, the acceptance now of Titoism in the Soviet camp has a certain disturbing influence upon the Soviet hold over the satellites who think that perhaps Tito is getting the best of both worlds and that seems to be entirely acceptable now to the Soviet Union; therefore, why shouldn't they follow on that same path? So I do think that, while the Soviets have not indicated any policy of relinquishing their hold, their hold is becoming looser.

#### **Proposed Advisory Board**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower Saturday night suggested some sort of rotating advisory board for foreign policy. Have you given any thought to a plan like that? Do you know what he meant?*

A. Yes, I think I know what he meant. I spoke here last week of the fact that we recognized the desirability of having a study made of the foreign aid and whether it is being conducted along

the most effective lines, and so forth. That statement of the President was in pursuance of the same thought. We are studying that whole question rather intensely at the present time, and I hope that within a few days we may be able to come up with some concrete proposals in that sense. We are, of course, in that respect, taking account of the point of view which has been expressed in Congress by Senator George in relation to the Foreign Relations Committee. We know that, also, Congressman Richards and the Foreign Affairs Committee are interested in that problem.

*Q. Will this board be confined strictly to foreign aid, Mr. Secretary, or a broader range?*

A. Well, it is primarily conceived of in terms of foreign aid. Did you mean to imply economic aid as distinguished from military?

*Q. No. It seemed to me that the President was suggesting a board which would consider a wider range of foreign problems rather than—*

A. No, I think he was only thinking of it in terms of the foreign aid, and perhaps primarily the economic aspect of it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back, if we may for a second, to the Middle East, are we or would we attempt to discourage Israel from resuming digging in the so-called demilitarized zone on the Jordan River project?*

A. Well, the situation still is, I suppose, juridically the same as it was when that project was interrupted about 3 years ago, at the behest of the United Nations, of General Bennike, then the Chairman of the Armistice Commission, on the ground that it was a violation of the armistice. And I don't know of anything that has happened to change that juridical position since then.

#### **Policy Toward U.S.S.R.**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the cold war, you say you reject—if I heard it correctly—the idea of keeping alive the hatred of the Soviet Union. The President has said, I believe, that the Russian basic concept of world communism has not changed despite these surface changes. And you attach a number of "ifs" to the possibility of changes within the Soviet Union. What, sir, should be the attitude of the average American*

toward the Soviet Union in this context? What do we do about exchange of students? The University of Chicago wanted to invite a Russian student, which was not permitted, according to the story. Do we have, as yet, a new concept of the American posture, so to speak, toward Russia?

A. We are adopting a somewhat more liberal policy in that respect than was the case a year or more ago. On the other hand, we do in the application of our policy consider not merely the question of whether or not a particular action would be good or even tolerable, as between our two countries, but we also take into account the effect of our example upon other countries who perhaps might not be able to have the same relationship without their getting into difficulties. The Soviets are very prone to turn to a smaller, weaker country, and say, "Well, we had this kind of relationship with the United States. Why don't you do the same? If the United States does it, well, why not you?" Now, it may very well be that the Soviet Union has projects to ensnare that smaller and weaker country which would be promoted if that country had the same kind of relationship which we could have with impunity. Therefore, we take into account not merely the question of whether or not what we do would be tolerable as between our two countries, but what use the Soviet Union can make of that example when it turns to a third country and says, "Well, now, the United States set the example; why shouldn't you follow it?"

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in London the other day Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin reportedly said that that was the half-way stop on the way to America and that they would like to come here after the election. Has any thought been given to asking them?*

A. Well, I am not aware of any such thought being given to their coming here, and possibly after they have had this experience with the half-way stop they might not want to go all the rest of the way. (Laughter)

*Q. Have we given any thought to inviting Mr. Zhukov here?*

A. Not that I know of.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to leave for Paris?*

A. On next Tuesday afternoon.

## Communism and Nationalism

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain changes in the Soviet Union as putting a premium on Titoism. Could you specify for us which particular changes you have in mind?*

A. Of course, the most important characteristic of Titoism is the fact that it recognizes that communism can be a national organization, not necessarily an international organization. That was the thesis which was held in Russia by Bukharin and his associates, who were purged and executed in the 1930's because they took the view that you could have communism within a country but did not necessarily have to be a part of what is commonly called international communism.

The view then held by Stalin was that you could not have communism just within one country but that you had to have communism as a dynamic movement which was trying to get control of all countries. In that sense Stalin's communism was incompatible with nationalism. Indeed, Stalin himself said that Soviet communism is the most international of all organizations because it tries to break down all of the national boundaries. As against this some people held the view that communism could be a national phenomenon rather than an international phenomenon. That was the view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on that issue because Moscow did not admit his right to have a national communistic state which would primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugoslavia.

If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all right to have communism on a national basis, that offers a great prospect to the Poles, the Czechs, and so forth, who would much rather have their own national brand of communism than be run by Moscow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev seems to have created some excitement in Britain yesterday with a remark about working on a guided missile with an atomic or hydrogen warhead. Do you have any comment on this remark of his?*

A. Well, that is not primarily within my area. I think it is no secret that they have been working on this for some time. I just checked, for curiosity, this morning to see what the interpretation of Mr. Khrushchev's remark was as being given out by the Soviet press, because there was some question as to just what he had said. And I just was



given, as I came down here, a note which says that the Soviet radio reports it as follows: "I also think that we are not behind in the development of guided missiles," which is a slightly more moderate statement than what was reported by some as the version of what he said.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe Isaac Stern, a young American violinist, is going to the Soviet Union next Saturday for a 4-week tour. This is in return for some very successful Russian appearances here. Do you think this favors the thawing of relations, or does it create some erroneous impressions here—the way you felt, I believe, about the agricultural mission at one point?*

A. No, I would think that the exchange of genuine artists would probably be a good thing. Of course, if the artists are spies in disguise, that's another matter. But a genuine artist, I believe, can go about the world, and it is good for everybody to have fine music made available.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## Second Meeting of Council of Baghdad Pact Organization

*Following are texts of statements made by United States observers during the second meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran, April 10-20, together with the final communique issued on April 20.<sup>1</sup>*

### STATEMENT BY LOY W. HENDERSON<sup>2</sup>

Press release 200 dated April 17

I take this occasion to express on behalf of the delegation of the United States our deep appreciation of the courtesies and consideration which we are receiving from our kind hosts, the Government of Iran, and of the effective measures which have been taken for the organization of this meeting.

I take pleasure in bringing to you today the greetings of the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of De-

fense on this occasion of the second meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact Organization.

It means much to me personally again to be in the Middle East and to have the opportunity to meet so many old friends and to make new friends from countries whose friendship my own country values so highly.

Our delegation considers it a privilege to be able to sit with such a distinguished group of representatives of friendly nations which, like the United States, are so deeply interested in the maintenance of the peace and security of the Middle East on a basis which would assure the preservation of the territorial integrity and the independence of the various nations of the area and would afford the peoples of the area maximum opportunities for political, economic, and social development.

Ambassadors Chapin and Gallman, Admiral Cassady, Mr. Seager, and I, together with the staffs which accompany us, are prepared to contribute to your deliberations and to assist in the work of your committees. We are anxious to do here all that is possible and appropriate to promote the achievement of our common objective.

At a time when the peace of the world is threatened in numerous areas by divisive conflicts, we look with hope toward those groups of nations which have banded together for their common security and welfare. We desire to work with such groups and so to strengthen them that they will demonstrate to other nations in the area that such cooperation is the true road to the achievement of national aspirations.

The American people are increasingly happy to work with the nations grouped in the Baghdad Pact in their cooperative efforts in the Middle East. In planning for the bilateral programs of economic and military assistance which we have with each of the Pact nations, we are taking strongly into account the courageous and unequivocal steps you have taken in forming this association. We have come prepared to discuss the supplementing of these bilateral programs through a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the Pact Organization. We will be pleased to carry back with us to our Government any suggestions which you may make for closer cooperation in the many fields of common endeavor which the Pact has opened.

We are certain, however, that we express the feelings of all who are here represented when we

<sup>1</sup> For text of the communique issued after the Council's first meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Made before the Council on Apr. 16. Deputy Under Secretary Henderson headed the U.S. delegation to the meeting.

say that it is our sincere desire to retain close, friendly, and effective ties with other nations of the area. We believe the Pact, based as it is on friendship toward all and hostility toward none, serves the interests of the area as a whole and provides no reason for impairing the good relations we all wish to maintain with your neighbors. In our relations with the other nations we shall continue to make clear our firm support for the Pact and our belief that it represents an effective organization for area cooperation and defense.

My colleagues and I look forward to a rewarding and stimulating conference with you during this meeting.

#### **STATEMENT BY CEDRIC SEAGER<sup>1</sup>**

Press release 200 dated April 17

The United States is deeply interested in the countries of the Baghdad Pact and their economic and social advancement. The United States will continue its assistance to these and other Middle East countries to raise their standards of living and safeguard their freedom and independence. Significant steps are being taken by all the Pact members to strengthen their internal economies. The economic progress which is being made holds encouraging promise for the future.

The United States believes that the work of the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact is contributing effectively toward the advancement of development programs which will bring greater prosperity and greater economic stability for all. The United States has followed with great and sympathetic interest the work of the Economic Committee and its subcommittees. They have assessed a broad range of subjects of common interest on which cooperative action is desirable. At its current session the Economic Committee has given stimulus to the progress which is being made in the economic development of the countries of the Pact. The United States looks forward with pleasure to a continuation of its cooperation with the members of the Pact, and I feel assured from this meeting that the Economic Committee is determined to carry forward the task it has

<sup>1</sup> Made at the closing session of the Council's Economic Committee on Apr. 11. Mr. Seager is Regional Director for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International Cooperation Administration.

undertaken. I congratulate the Economic Committee on its excellent work.

#### **CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. HENDERSON, APRIL 20**

On behalf of the United States observers I again desire to express our appreciation to His Imperial Majesty, the Shahinshah, and his Government for the warmth of their welcome, their hospitality, and for the excellent facilities made available to us.

Prime Minister Ala has chaired our meetings with the statesmanship and ability for which he has long been famous. We wish to congratulate the Secretariat which, under the capable direction of the Secretary-General, has done a superb job in its reporting and in making the necessary arrangements to permit the meetings to run smoothly.

Our participation in this meeting has been stimulating and inspiring. We have been deeply impressed by the restraint, wisdom, and understanding displayed by all of the delegations. We are firmly convinced that any area which can produce the statesmanship which has been evidenced at this meeting is certain to play a significant and beneficial role in world affairs.

As we bid you adieu we have the warm feeling which comes from being among friends. You may be sure that we, the United States observers, will faithfully convey to our Government the views which have been expressed to us. We wish all of you continued success in the implementing of this Pact which means so much to the security and welfare of the peoples of this area.

#### **TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE**

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second meeting of Ministers in Tehran from 16th to 19th April, 1956, under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Hussein Ala, Prime Minister of Iran.

2. The meeting was attended by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey and by the Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom. The United States were represented by a delegation of observers headed by the Hon. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

3. The Council emphasised that their several Governments adhered firmly to the principles that inspired the United Nations Charter. The Baghdad Pact was

fully in conformity with those principles. Its object was to assist in achieving the Charter's primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security and promoting human welfare. The Pact was wholly defensive in character. While its members were determined to defend themselves against aggression, they desired at the same time to live in peace with all Governments and all peoples.

4. The Council had before it the task of considering the reports and recommendations of various committees of the Baghdad Pact Organisation, and of reviewing the international political situation especially from the point of view of its repercussions on the Pact area.

5. In the light of their thorough review of the political situation, the Council considered that although there was a change of tactics, the basic objectives of international communism remained unchanged. Its activities in the area required that the free world continue to exercise unceasing vigilance if its solidarity was to be maintained and freedom and peace were to be preserved. There could be no relaxation of measures designed to strengthen the defensive capacity of this area. In the view of the Council, the criticism and attacks from neutralist and other sources directed against the Baghdad Pact and other similar organisations created to provide for the legitimate defence and peaceful development of their member nations, spring largely from lack of knowledge and misunderstanding of its true purposes. It is the hope of the Council that as these purposes become better known, these criticisms will give way to sympathetic and active co-operation and that the Baghdad Pact will become, as it is intended to be, a unifying factor among the peoples in the region who wish to preserve a free and democratic way of life. Meanwhile, these criticisms and attacks can only help to keep the region divided and weak and member countries decided to counter them actively and resolutely.

6. Specific problems which were causing tension in this area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular, the Council emphasised the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes.

7. In the midst of this troubled political situation, it was the Council's conviction that the Baghdad Pact offered the best means of safeguarding the peace and stability and of promoting the welfare and unity of the area, whilst at the same time it effectively served the cause of world peace. Urgent steps must, therefore, be taken to strengthen this Pact. For this purpose, member countries in this area must be equipped with the means for developing their military and economic strength and the Pact must yield positive visible results. At the same time, systematic efforts should be made to create a better understanding of the Pact among the nations which are opposing it.

8. The Council adopted the report of the Economic Committee and the various resolutions submitted by it. These provide for the establishment of a Centre for imparting training in the use of agricultural machinery and in methods of soil and water conservation, for establishing joint training centres for anti-malaria operations and health education, for undertaking jointly by two

or more countries surveys in the field of locusts and pests, for co-ordination of research in certain fields, and for exchange of technical personnel and of information on scientific and technical subjects. The Council agreed that it was necessary to implement the resolutions without delay, particularly those relating to projects which are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote the well being of the people in the Pact area. The Council noted with satisfaction that the Atomic Energy Centre was expected to open at Baghdad in January, 1957.

9. The Council drew special attention to the importance of joint projects of mutual interest to one or more member countries. It was decided that a technical Committee comprising members of each of the interested Governments should take place at Ankara to make a preliminary study of the possibility of a joint development plan of the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates basin and to make recommendations for the carrying out of any further detailed studies which may be required. The possibilities of development of mineral resources in the eastern parts of Iran and the timber reserve in Caspian provinces by the joint efforts of Iran and Pakistan were noted. The Council also decided to set up a working party to meet in June, 1956, at Tehran to consider the means whereby regional projects of interest to two or more members of the Pact could be studied and implemented through economic and technical assistance. The Council recognised the far reaching need for regional co-operation and joint projects in the fields of industry and communications.

10. The Council noted that the Economic Committee would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of production and trade between member countries with a view to promoting trade within the Pact area. The Council considered that notwithstanding the fact that the needs of the member countries in the Pact area were at present similar, there was scope for expansion of trade in this area in the immediate future. In this connection, Pakistan's recent offer to buy dates from Iraq was welcomed.

11. The Council recognised the importance of technical assistance between member countries. The Council agreed that the Secretariat should co-ordinate this work on the basis of the offers already received by the Economic Committee. It noted that the United Kingdom and Pakistan had offered technical assistance.

12. The Council welcomed the active participation of the United States in the work of the Pact Organisation. The Council considered that the active and continuing support of the United States for the Pact and its objectives was an essential factor in the strengthening and development of the member countries and in the realisation of their peaceful aims. The United States reaffirmed its solid support of the Pact and stated that it would continue to lend support to the individual and collective efforts of the Member nations to attain the political, defensive, economic and social objectives of the Pact.

13. The United States, on the invitation of the Council, became a full member of the Economic Committee and the Counter Subversion Committee. The terms of reference of these two Committees provide for the extension of membership to non-signatory governments at the discretion of the Council.

14. The United States delegate to the Economic Committee reaffirmed the intention of his country to continue its bilateral technical and economic assistance to the member nations, and indicated that the United States would consider ways of assisting joint projects undertaken by members of the Economic Committee of the Pact.

15. The United States observer to the Military Committee offered to establish a Military Liaison group at the permanent Headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, headed by a Flag or General Officer. The Council welcomed and accepted this proposal.

16. The United States observers expressed their Government's intention of continuing its military assistance to the member countries.

17. The Council considered that there is a threat of subversion in this area and agreed that it can be met most effectively by co-operation among members of the Pact. To this end the Council decided to establish a permanent organisation under the administrative control of the Secretary General. The Council recognised that while the threat of subversion could be countered with measures designed to expose its real nature and give the widest publicity to the aim and activities of the Pact, the essence of combating subversion lay in the eradication of the conditions in which it thrives, namely, economic under-development and defensive weakness. Both must be remedied as soon as possible.

18. In the light of the common determination that the territorial integrity of the Member states of the Pact shall be defended the Military Committee decided to expedite all necessary further measures for the defence of the Baghdad Pact countries. The Council considered the report of the Committee and noted that considerable progress had already been achieved in the military sphere.

19. The Council decided that its next meeting at Ministerial level should be held at Karachi in the month of January, 1957, and that in the meanwhile the Council will continue to meet regularly at the Deputies' level.

## Visit of Vice President of Brazil

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 220) that the members of the party of João Goulart, Vice President of Brazil, who will visit Washington from April 30 to May 3, will be as follows:

João Goulart, Vice President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil; Senhora Goulart

João Lima Teixeira, Senator from the State of Bahia

Fernando Ferrari, Federal Deputy from the State of Rio Grande do Sul

Roberto Silveira, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro

Geraldo Eulalio Nascimento e Silva, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Eugenio Caillar, Executive Secretary to the Vice President Yara Vargas Lopes, Secretary to Senhora Goulart

The party will leave Washington on May 3 for

a 2-week private tour which will include visits to the King Ranch in Texas, Kansas City, Detroit, and New York.

## Change in NATO Command

*Following are texts of statements and documents relating to the retirement of Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the appointment of Gen. Lauris Norstad as his successor.*

### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 13

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release

The White House today announced that the President has with deep regret accepted the request of General Alfred M. Gruenther for retirement from the United States Army toward the end of this year.

General Gruenther is at present serving as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under appointment by the North Atlantic Council. The Council has acceded to the President's request that General Gruenther be released from this NATO Command upon retirement.

The White House also announced that, in response to a subsequent request by the North Atlantic Council, the President has nominated and the Council has approved the appointment of General Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in succession to General Gruenther. The appointment will take effect at a date to be decided later.

In a letter to General Gruenther, the President said, "The announcement of your decision to request relief as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and to retire from active military service will be received with great disappointment by our European Allies and by the American people. All appreciate the magnificent contribution you have made toward the fulfillment of the objectives of NATO and, I am certain, will wish to join with me in congratulating you on your performance. You have been intimately associated with NATO since its inception. To your task as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, you brought a wealth of military experience and a unique quality of leadership which you have unselfishly and with great distinction employed in improving the effec-



iveness and solidarity of the forces under your command."

In the letter nominating General Norstad, the President said, "General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability. He has the special qualification of long years of experience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The confidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been amply demonstrated. It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, defend against aggression so that mankind may live and prosper in freedom. I am confident that under General Norstad's leadership this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly upheld."

#### **ANNOUNCEMENT BY NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, APRIL 13**

1. The North Atlantic Council have been informed of the contents of a communication from the President of the United States of America to the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council, in which he asked that the member governments should agree to the release at his own request towards the end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe in order to permit his retirement from active duty.

2. The Council agreed with great regret to release General Gruenther from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They recognised that General Gruenther had fully discharged the trust reposed in him by the Council when, in May 1953, they appointed him as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him.

3. The Council then unanimously decided to request the President of the United States of America to nominate an officer of the US Armed Forces for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Europe to succeed General Gruenther. The request was immediately transmitted to the President of the United States, who informed the Council of his nomination of General Lauris Norstad for consideration by the Council as successor to General Gruenther.

4. The Council at a meeting this afternoon

unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that they reposed the greatest faith in General Norstad and appointed him Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as successor to General Gruenther, with the same powers and functions. The appointment will become effective towards the end of this year.

ANNEX I. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LORD ISMAY

10TH APRIL, 1956

DEAR LORD ISMAY,

I am addressing you as Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council with the request that appropriate action be taken at an early date to secure the release toward the end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In making this request through you to the Member Nations who appointed him, I ask that they give favorable consideration to his release.

Personal considerations have led General Gruenther to request retirement from active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States toward the end of this year. I believe his distinguished career of dedicated national and international service has earned for him the right to have his request granted.

The steady growth of Communist armed strength, compelling the NATO Nations to maintain their deterrent and defensive strength, emphasizes the continued necessity for outstanding leadership at SHAPE. The Council will shortly proceed to appoint an able officer to the vacancy created by General Gruenther's retirement. Surely the Nation invited to nominate a successor will propose its most eligible officer available.

Afforded the same high degree of trust and cooperation that Nations have extended to General Gruenther, the new SACEUR will, I am confident, be successful in carrying out his vital responsibilities.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable LORD ISMAY, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,  
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty  
Organization,  
Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris.

ANNEX II. COUNCIL RESOLUTION ACCEPTING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER AND REQUESTING NOMINATION OF A US OFFICER TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR

#### **THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:**

Having considered a communication by the President of the United States to the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council requesting him to initiate appropriate action to secure the release of General Alfred M. Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe,

Agrees with great regret to the release towards the end of this year of General Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

Recognises that General Gruenther has fully discharged the trust reposed in him by the North Atlantic Council

when in May 1953, the Council appointed him Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

Expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the Governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him;

Unanimously requests the President of the United States to nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of the United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Europe to succeed General Gruenther, at a date to be decided later.

ANNEX III. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LORD ISMAY

13TH APRIL, 1956

DEAR LORD ISMAY,

Pursuant to the request of the North Atlantic Council that I nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of the United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe, to succeed General Alfred M. Gruenther, I hereby nominate General Lauris Norstad.

General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability. He has the special qualification of long years of experience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The confidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been amply demonstrated.

It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, defend against aggression so that mankind may live and prosper in freedom. I am confident that under General Norstad's leadership this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly upheld.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable LORD ISMAY, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,  
*Secretary General of the  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*

## The Purge of Stalinism

by Allen W. Dulles  
*Director of Central Intelligence*<sup>1</sup>

There is never a dull moment in my job as Director of Central Intelligence. Events which seem to defy analysis happen somewhere in the world every day. Few trends seem to follow a predictable course.

These last few weeks there have been developments in the Soviet Union which have puzzled all the experts who generally have ready answers—sometimes more ready than accurate—to explain Soviet conduct. Just at a time when some are saying that everything is going wrong with foreign policy in the free-world countries but that everything in the Soviet Union is progressing according to some great master design, the Soviet collective leadership, as they call it, comes forward to beat their collective breasts and indulge in the most extreme self-criticism.

The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all they said earlier about events in the U.S.S.R. during the 20 years preceding Stalin's death is quite wrong; that in fact this was an era of in-

famy, crime, and shame. They admit that their past adulation of Stalin was based on fear, not on fact. The man they themselves used to call the "glorious Stalin, genius of mankind" is now being publicly accused of "grave errors" and privately described as a malicious monster.

The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain why the new collective leaders waited for 3 years after Stalin's death to tell it to their people. They do not make a very satisfactory showing as to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seats of the mighty during all the period of Stalin's dictatorship, exercising great powers as members of his inner circle.

Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have admitted, the price of nonconformity was a bullet in the head. This is a very human excuse but a poor qualification for high office on the part of those who now assert the rights and prerogatives of leadership. In the free world, where we aspire to build on the great traditions of the past, not to repudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders those who refused to conform, whatever the risks, when the principles of liberty were at stake.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on Apr. 13.

In the U.S.S.R., evidently, acquiescing in crime as the price of simple survival under a political tyrant is sanctioned as legitimate conduct. As they put it: "The point was not to save one's own life; the point was to save the revolution."

### Years of Stalin's Power

Before going further into the details of this strange development in the Soviet Union it may be worth while to review briefly what had been taking place there during the years of Stalin's power. Here we may find clues as to why the men in the Kremlin now take the serious risks of repudiating their late hero for having put the individual above party and substituting a personal dictatorship for a collective one.

Stalin himself ran through a series of revolutionary combinations, somewhat akin to collective leaderships, during the 1920's. For example, in 1924-25 he combined with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky. From 1925-27, a new alliance between Stalin, Bukharin, and Rykov was formed and routed a Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev combination. And finally, from 1927-29, Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and others to crush Stalin's recent allies, Bukharin and Rykov.

It was during the 10 years which preceded Russia's entry into World War II that Stalin completed the consolidation of his control over the Communist Party machinery. By that time he had placed his loyal stooges in all important positions of authority throughout the Soviet Union and the army was brought under political control.

Among the major charges said to have been leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge that in the late thirties he deliberately liquidated Marshal Tukhachevsky and thousands of the best officers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure his political control of the military apparatus. Certainly today there is good reason to believe that Marshal Tukhachevsky was falsely accused of conniving with the Germans. There is some evidence that there was a clever German plot to discredit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in with Stalin's own plans.

We do know that during and after the war there was burning resentment among the Soviet professional soldiers at Stalin's interference in the conduct of the war, his unjust and capricious belittling of heroes such as Zhukov, and his arrogant

claims to personal credit for Soviet victories. A senior Soviet general, for example, is recently reported as having privately branded their so-called documentary film, "The Fall of Berlin," which shows Stalin as the great military mastermind, as a "tissue of lies."

Today the collective dictatorship is assiduously repairing the injured dignity of the military and incorporating its leadership into Communist Party membership. They must realize that, following the usual pattern of revolutions, the military leaders might tire of being the pawn of dictators, whether individual or collective.

But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar decade, one can hardly ascribe them to his old age or senility. Stalin was then in his prime. Furthermore, one can hardly believe that the acts of the dictator in a war from which he emerged as a hero are the motivating causes for the present attempt to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most recent Soviet pronouncements are tending to refer to "good" and "bad" Stalin eras. Naturally, there is no desire to repudiate such measures as farm collectivization and the rapid industrialization under the Five-Year Plans, which are so closely associated with his name. The beginning of the "bad" period was in 1934, when the great Stalin purges began. If they denounce his war record, the purpose here must be to eliminate him from the hero class and to give the military some of the credit he had arrogated to himself.

But to find the real reasons for the de-Stalinization campaign, we must, I believe, look to the more recent past, particularly to the hard autocratic period during the last 6 or 7 years of Stalin's life. Here we find two major motivations for cutting away from Stalin worship.

Internationally, from about 1947 onward to the time of his death, Stalin's often bellicose policy in the international field had been a failure and had tended to unite the free world against international communism. Domestically during this period his police state was meeting ever-increasing disfavor, not only with the helpless people but with the top politicians, generals, and industrial managers who were essential to the working of the Soviet system. This began to create problems for the regime.

### The International Problem

First, let us look at the international picture. In the immediate postwar era, riding the crest of the common victory and maintaining military

strength and power, Soviet policy had notable successes. It consolidated the grip on the European satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to victory.

But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, somewhat later in Asia, the free world at last began to realize the implications of the forward drive of international communism and started to take countermeasures, and the tide began to turn.

What happened in these years? The Marshall plan, which Stalin and Molotov indignantly rejected and tried to defeat, was put into effect, and Europe was saved from economic chaos. In Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla tactics was thwarted.

When the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin and destroy this outpost of Western freedom, the Berlin blockade was frustrated by the airlift, and West Berlin remains a show window of what the free world can do. Tito survived his ejection from the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and struck back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy—almost identical with what Soviet leaders are now themselves saying.

Later the North Atlantic alliance was organized, and despite Soviet threats the way was opened for German rearmament in close union with the West.

Thus frustrated in the European field Stalin turned to the Far East and, working with the North Korean and Chinese Communists, attempted to take over Korea as the first step toward driving America from the western Pacific. Again the Communists were blocked, and, most important of all, an alarmed and awakened American public opinion proceeded to the defensive rearmament of this country. Our nuclear power was vastly increased.

It is understandable that Stalin's successors should have found it convenient to place upon him the blame for Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia, German rearmament, and the like and, in particular, for the generally hard Soviet line which has led to the buildup of American defense forces and NATO. It was these successes which led the Soviet Union to conclude that a peace treaty with Austria was necessary to build up their badly shattered reputation as peacemongers and to prepare the way for a summit conference, their pilgrimage of penitence to Belgrade, and their effort to line the Socialist parties into new popular fronts.

### The Domestic Situation

But the foreign scene alone by no means explains the urge the present Kremlin leaders felt to break with the hard Stalinist past. They were already making progress in allowing the memory of Stalin to fade in international recognition and prestige without going to the extreme of total destruction of the Stalin myth with their own people. Thus the clue to their present policy lies more in the internal Soviet situation than in the requirements of their foreign policy.

Domestically they have been caught in a dilemma. In order to compete with the Western World in the fields of science and industry, which was vitally important for their economic growth and their rearmament program, it was essential for the Soviet to speed up the education of their people, especially in the scientific and technical field. After Stalin's death the regime encouraged more objectivity in scientific inquiry and put on the shelf some pseudoscientists such as Lysenko. After all, they had found out early in the game that in the present nuclear age one could not fool around with scientists who tailored their art to the whims of Marxism.

Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit their educational processes to the scientific fields, and more and more young men and women are graduating from schools which correspond to our high schools and colleges and are taking advanced degrees comparable to our degrees of Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. Even with all the indoctrination in Communist teachings which they give to their young students it is impossible to prevent education from developing the critical faculties which every thinking human being possesses.

Furthermore, as part of their new campaign of sweetness and light, they have found it wise to take down some of the bars which have impeded travel between the Soviet Union and the free countries; and while the Iron Curtain still remains and there is a careful selective process as to those who are permitted to leave the Soviet Union or to visit it, it is obvious that today there is far more contact between the people of the U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at any time in recent years.

All this has tended to build up pressures upon the Soviet rulers to create an impression, not only internationally but also domestically, that a dictatorship of the Stalin type was dead forever.



The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their external and internal dilemmas by finding a convenient "devil" which they can use to explain away past Soviet sins to the world abroad and to their own people, as well as to demonstrate that the present rulers of the Soviet are different mentally and morally than they were under Stalin. Thus they hope that their own people will accept their protestations that the days of government by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, deportations, and prison camps are over. Furthermore, they are again promising that they will do something to raise the standard of living so that the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned with a greater share of consumers goods and a more abundant life.

### **Threat to Communist Party**

The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist-type regime must have been gaged by the Kremlin as far stronger and deeper among the Russian people than we had dared to hope. Nonetheless, the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with it a very real threat to the internal discipline and units of the Soviet Communist Party and the international Communist movement.

That calculated risk must have been taken deliberately by men who knew they had to have a scapegoat if they were to hope to preserve the dictatorship on which their own power and very survival rested. By attacking the personal symbol of Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule, they hope to be able to preserve many of the essentials of the Stalinist system—now labeling it Leninism—the monopoly of all power by a single party, the complete subordination of the courts and individual rights to arbitrary Party decree, the governmental control of the press and of all organs of public information.

### **Basic Structure To Be Preserved**

This basic structure is meant to be preserved intact. Already the regime has publicly warned that some "rotten elements" have taken the de-Stalinization campaign too literally and are "trying to question the correctness of the Party's policy." This, *Pravda* thundered, is "petty bourgeois licentiousness" of a kind the "Party has never tolerated and will never tolerate." A dead and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be merely a device—here possibly a Trojan corpse

rather than a Trojan horse—with which the long-suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of a freer and better life.

Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it would take something more than a mere repetition of the old clichés to have any effect. Apparently this necessity was deemed to be urgent and impelling. They had tried to do the trick with the liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding his execution was hardly a persuasive bit of evidence of a new dawn of liberty. It was in the worst tradition of the Stalin era—and he, after all, generally gave his victims at least a drumhead public trial.

The degradation of Stalin, if the Soviet program had worked as the leaders had apparently planned it, was to be under strict Party discipline. But it seems to have got out of hand. When Khrushchev briefed the Party leaders assembled at the 20th Congress in Moscow at a secret meeting on February 25th, the representatives of foreign Communist Parties were excluded but the Party leaders from all parts of the U.S.S.R. were there. They were to take the gospel by word of mouth to the local precinct leaders. What was planned, apparently, was a gradual process of burying the dead leader's memory. Different medicine was to be reserved for the faithful followers of Stalin in the satellites, each according to their needs.

Something may have gone wrong with this careful planning. It is possible that difficult questions were posed by those Party workers who had been taught for decades to worship Stalin and who knew that Khrushchev, Bulganin, and the whole Politburo owed their positions to him. On the other hand, Khrushchev may have deliberately planned to give the Party the "shock treatment" to give more conviction to the "new men" and "new times" theory.

At any rate, whatever may have been the plan, the reports are unanimous, as published in the press of every free country without effective denial from Moscow, that Khrushchev ended up by branding Stalin not only as a heartless dictator but as a tyrant and murderer, an incompetent military leader whose bungling in both war and peace had brought the Soviet Union to the verge of ruin. In the same breath, Stalin, the leading theoretician of communism for the past 25 years, was labeled a heretic and his interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy were rejected.

It may be well at this point to consider the position and character of the men who have now brought these charges. All of them had been for many long years prominently associated with Stalin's policies. Some had been his hatchetmen in many of the less savory acts of his checkered career. Certainly no leader in history ever took such elaborate precautions as Stalin to insure that the men around him were loyal beyond the shadow of a doubt. That his henchmen, now that he is dead, so bitterly repudiated Stalin is a commentary on the totalitarian system of government itself and the leaders it breeds.

#### **Position and Character of the Accusers**

The main attack on Stalin's record was made by the Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He had held key jobs under Stalin since 1935 and had organized and carried through, for Stalin, the purges in the Ukraine. In January of 1938, he was named as alternate member of the Politburo and has been a full member of that body since 1939. Without wavering, he followed the Stalinist lines and on the dictator's 70th birthday, December 21, 1949, he had this to say:

Hail to the father, sage teacher, and brilliant leader of the Party, the Soviet people, and the toilers of all the world, Comrade Stalin.

The number-two man in the anti-Stalin crusade has been Anastas Mikoyan. In fact, he was the first at the recent 20th Congress to criticize Stalin by name. Mikoyan held key jobs under Stalin for approximately 30 years. Stalin installed him as Commissar of Trade and made him candidate member of the Politburo in 1926, when Mikoyan was 31—the youngest person ever to attain Politburo rank. He has adjusted to every turn of the Soviet policy line and remained in the front political ranks ever since.

Others who have been parties to this great debunking exercise were, of course, Bulganin, who had worked with Stalin since 1931; Kaganovich, who had been at his side since 1924; Malenkov, who had been a member of his personal secretariat for some 25 years, whose career was made by Stalin; and, finally, Molotov, the longest Stalin associate of them all. He had worked with the dictator since about 1912 in the early days of the illegal Communist conspiracy.

There is good reason to believe that Molotov has

joined the ranks of Stalin detractors with reluctance. Certainly a Stalinist at heart, he must have viewed recent events with a heavy heart and with the knowledge that the recent deviations of which he has been openly accused are a prelude to his gradual retirement from the duties of his office. I incline to believe that Molotov's real sentiments are those he expressed at Stalin's grave and then more recently when, after Malenkov's demotion in 1954, he exuberantly reaffirmed his faith in Stalinist principles.

All of these men, while they now find it convenient to dissociate themselves from the dead tyrant, show no intention of accepting the normal consequences of long association with a repudiated leader and a discredited policy nor of relinquishing the benefits they acquired under Stalin and the power which they are now enjoying as his pupils and successors.

The leaders of the Soviet Union today are walking a dangerous tightrope. They are trying to discredit Stalin without discrediting the Communist Party, which he led so long, or the men who worked with him. Human memories are short and perhaps they may succeed in this maneuver. But surely many a Communist will question the good faith of these leaders. The reversal is too abrupt to invite confidence. After all, it was only a little over 3 years ago, on March 9, 1953, that Stalin was buried. At that time these men who are now castigating him joined in the most lavish tribute and they brought together in Moscow the Communist leaders of China and the European satellites to do him homage.

This is what his short-time heir, Georgi Malenkov, had to say:

The policy of Stalin will live for ages and thankful posterity will praise his name just as we do. . . . Comrade Stalin, a great thinker of our epoch, creatively developed in new historical conditions the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin's name justly stands with the names of the greatest people in all the history of mankind—Marx—Engels—Lenin.

The Chinese Communists and the Moscow-designated rulers of the European satellites who attended Stalin's funeral must now have some question in their minds today as to the forthrightness of the present Kremlin leaders who induced them to join in this homage. Recently, the Chinese Communists spent several weeks before publishing their acceptance of Moscow views of the late Soviet dictator.

### Basis for Questioning Their Sincerity

Certainly it is not for us to defend the Stalinist dictatorship, its cruelties and perversions, as against its present detractors. We do have a right, however, to question the sincerity of those who today tell us that for 20 years and more they were a party to foisting on the world a tissue of lies and deceit.

Their sincerity is basically to be questioned on three counts. First, they have been willing to criticize and condemn only carefully selected faults of the Stalin regime. They have specifically endorsed acts that both within Russia and in the world at large caused the most widespread and terrible human suffering: for example, the deliberate starvation of the Russian peasantry during the collectivization campaign of the early thirties; and the exploitation of the captive peoples of the eastern European satellites, where proud and independent nations were crushed in defiance of solemn international obligations. Mikoyan at the 20th Congress even had the effrontery to boast of the Czech coup as an example of how Communist parties can come to power by "peaceful" and "parliamentary" means.

Secondly, they have failed to repudiate the arbitrary dictatorial rule that allows life and death issues to be settled by a handful of men—whether by one or a half-dozen matters not to the Russian peasant.

The 20th Congress in its unreal and sheep-like unanimity was an example of the fact that the present four-, five-, or six-man leadership intends to permit little real debate and criticism of basic policy. Not one voice was raised to protest the decree designed to force the peasants on the collective farms to devote all their efforts to the collective by severely limiting the time allowed for work on their private plots. The widespread opposition to this decree that must exist among the Russian farmers went unrepresented and unheard as the last Party Congress proceeded to rubberstamp every resolution put before it.

Thirdly, whatever improvements have been made in assuring the personal security and welfare of the individual Russian, that progress is dependent on the whim of the Presidium, popularly known as the Politburo. The stick can be used later if the carrot doesn't work.

What we now have is a kind of "mutual protective association" among a few men who suffered

under Stalin so long that they are willing to cooperate to keep the full police power of the state out of the hands of any one man. There is no hint that any ordinary Russian who tries to dissent against the regime will escape the wrath of Servo's gunmen any more than he would have escaped when Beria was alive. If necessary to preserve their own skins, these men might return to unrestricted terror like ducks to water. It was their native element for years.

The final and real test of the intentions of the Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to accept those basic institutional changes that can give the Russian people and the world in general genuine assurance that a one-man—or three- or four-man—dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive domestic or international crimes of the recent past.

In the end, opposition parties, an independent judiciary, and a free press are the only real safeguards against successive dictators, each with his own power lust and a new cult of personality.

### Problems the Communists Face

The problems which this right-about-face presents for the worldwide Communist movement both within and outside of the U.S.S.R. are immense. Here are a few of them:

Stalin was not only the dictator of his country for more than two decades; he was also hailed as its great military leader in war, its prophet, and the interpreter of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. His writings, particularly the *Problems of Leninism* and the *Short History of the Communist Party*, are scattered in tens of millions of copies throughout the Communist world. It will be years before they can be removed from circulation. In fact, all Soviet history for the past 30 years must now be rewritten. They won't be able to handle this quite as they did in the case of Beria. Here they sent to all holders of the Soviet encyclopedia instructions to excise the pages praising Beria and insert a puffed-up story on the Bering Straits (which fitted in in proper alphabetical order).

Stalin's name is on thousands of streets and squares. Cities and towns bear his name throughout the Communist world. For the people of the Soviet Union, Stalingrad stands as the symbol of their victory over Hitlerism. Will his name remain here and elsewhere, or will the attempt be made to blot it out?

Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. They hold key places in the European satellite regimes. Each and every one of these appointees must today fear not only for his future but for his life.

Already political idols are toppling or at least swaying in the wind from Moscow—in Bulgaria, in Hungary, in Poland. Names of former leaders who crossed Stalin are coming back into repute daily, and political circles in the satellites are plainly in confusion and near panic trying to figure out where the line of propriety will be drawn next.

As Alfred Robens, a leader of the British Labor Party, recently remarked, "How do you correct the mistake of having shot a man? Do you restore him to the history books or give him a posthumous reward?"

The problem of justifying past crimes is especially difficult in the foreign Communist parties, such as those in France and Italy, where local leaders clung to Stalin's coattails and did his bidding without having the excuse of the pistol at their head. These men could have denounced Stalin's crimes earlier and lived—unlike the men in Moscow. Why did they not do so? This is the question we ought to keep asking every Italian tempted to play ball with Togliatti.

And what about the reputation of Trotsky, a key Stalinist victim, still on the Soviet blacklist? Here and there, in places as far distant from each other as Ceylon and Bolivia, his followers are meeting to stage a comeback, and the view is being tolerated, at least, in the satellites that he was not a traitor but merely a misguided and erroneous would-be leader.

And what about the numerous violations of those international agreements signed by Stalin? Was he a "devil" when he made them, or when he broke them, or both?

The Soviet people well remember that Stalin himself started as one of a triumvirate not very different from the collective leadership of which the Soviet leaders now boast. How can the Soviet people themselves be sure that this small group of men in the Politburo who exercise complete and arbitrary control over the lives of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not, in the course of a few years, again lead to a personal dictatorship with all the vices that they now attribute to Stalinism? Is it not the system itself rather than

the "cult of personality" that breeds tyranny and cruelty and ends in the revolution devouring its own children?

And, finally, is it not possible that the Soviet people, with the leaven of education they are receiving, will demand some decisive share in the selection of their own leadership and some checks and balances against the danger of tyrannical dictatorship and the "cult of personality"?

All Marxists have been trained in the dogma that human beings are the products of their environment. Might not Soviet Marxists begin to think there is something wrong with a political environment in which, over the years, an incredible percentage of the most influential leaders—including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Beria, and now Stalin—have turned out to be criminals? Might not the Soviet people, and even some of their present or future leaders, come to believe that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely"?

In Moscow the pictures of Stalin are gradually disappearing. I am told that the Red Army theater has solved the problem of filling the space formerly occupied by an enormous portrait in an ingenious way that may be symbolic. On the wall where Stalin's picture used to hang is now a huge mirror. Any ambitious leader can see himself in Stalin's place. Might this not prove to be the curse of the Stalinist system—one which cannot be easily escaped by pious resolves?

The only element of power in the Soviet Union which is not directly implicated in the excesses and atrocities of Stalin, namely the military leadership, may have something to say about all this. While there is nothing concrete to suggest it now, some day a "man on horseback" might fancy himself in that mirror.

#### **Weighing the Issues**

When the present Soviet leaders took the risks involved in their present policy, they must have carefully weighed the consequences. They must have realized the grave issues it would raise in the Communist world outside of the U.S.S.R., among the Party faithful in every free country, and among their own peoples.

Abroad they probably hoped there would be some counterbalancing advantages. If it would bring about a feeling of relaxation in the free world, defensive rearmament here and among our



allies might slow down, defensive alliances might tend to weaken, the possibility of peaceful coexistence, for which everyone yearns, might be more and more accepted. All this they hoped would give them time to build up their own strength, economic and military. If we are naive, then the Soviet Union may get some international benefits from their present tactics.

But there is another side to the picture which bears pondering. The Soviet leaders may have had no real alternative and took the course which they felt held out the best chance of keeping their own power. The Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned, were under heavy domestic pressures to do something to persuade their people that a new era was in the making. During recent years the leavening process of education has developed the critical faculties of millions of Russians. The Kremlin can no longer sell the old line to all of their people. They must now not only rewrite the history of Stalin but rewrite the story they have been telling their people about the outside world.

These leaders—Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich—have got over the hump of Stalin's death without losing their grip on his power. They profess a great deal of confidence in their ability to perpetuate the system of collective dictatorship they have instituted by basing it more broadly on the top layer of elite Party managers, generals, engineers, and intellectuals who have a stake in the Soviet regime.

Only time can tell whether the present leaders with their past close association with Stalinism really can do this and make the Soviet dictatorship work without going much farther and giving their people something more than mere lipservice in the direction of the right to free speech, free worship, and protection for the individual from arbitrary action.

Possibly what we are seeing will end up as a temporary period of attempted fraud on the Russian people, a cloak to sell them a collective dictatorship as against a personal dictatorship. Possibly it is a first hesitant step toward giving a greater number of the Russian people a chance to share in the decisions which shape their destinies. I am sure the Russian leaders themselves do not know how their effort to "de-Stalinize" the Soviet Union will turn out. I am also sure they would be dismayed if they thought they were paving the way for the establishment in Russia of

what we could call a decent and responsible government.

The Communists, despite their self-confidence, do not and will not control the fate of mankind. In the face of firm free-world resistance to their international barbarities and exposure of their political frauds and malpractices, at home and abroad, and under the pressure of their own people, there may be a gradual move toward more normal modes of life and behavior. If so, then hopes of world peace will be given a mighty impulse forward. This possibility the free world must watch prayerfully, alert to opportunities for peace provided by progress in this direction. We must be equally alert to perceive and denounce the dangers implicit in the fraud of a mere attempt to bury a shabby past.

## Departure of Former Seamen of Soviet Tanker

Press release 217 dated April 25

At the request of the Department of State, Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zaroubin called on Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant this afternoon. The Ambassador was handed a note concerning the departure from the United States of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*.<sup>1</sup> The text of the note follows:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the circumstances surrounding the departure from the United States for the Soviet Union on April 7, 1956 of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*.

"It has been determined after thorough investigation that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations assumed authority and engaged in activities with respect to the seamen which are incompatible with the status of the Soviet Delegation. In this regard the conduct of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin was particularly objectionable. Ambassador Arkady Sobolev himself insisted on intervening, despite the presence of an accredited representative from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, during the interview conducted at Idlewild by the authorities

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1954, p. 51; July 26, 1954, p. 131; and Aug. 22, 1955, p. 302.

of the Immigration and Naturalization Service prior to departure of the seamen.

"It is considered that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations thereby performed acts of an improper character exceeding the scope of their official capacity and thereby abused the privilege of their residence in contravention of the terms of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations.

"It is requested that the Soviet Government instruct Ambassador Arkady Sobolev and his staff henceforth to adhere to their recognized functions. In view of the special character of the activities of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin, the Soviet Government is informed that their presence in the United States is no longer desirable. It is accordingly requested that Aleksandr K. Guryanov make expeditious arrangements to leave the United States. On the same grounds the request for a return visa for Nikolai Turkin to reenter the United States is hereby refused."

### **Export Controls Simplified for European Soviet Bloc**

The Department of Commerce announced on April 27 the simplification of certain export controls by the establishment of a new general license order under which shipment from a select roster of peaceful goods can be made to the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites without the filing of export license applications.<sup>1</sup> The action came in the form of an initial listing of some 700 nonstrategic items in over 57 commodity categories which U.S. exporters may now ship under general license to the European Soviet bloc.

All of the goods included on the new roster are of the type that would be approved for export under existing licensing policy. The new general license procedure in no way reflects a change in the policy of banning strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. The main purpose is to reduce the paper burden on the American export community and the Government by eliminating the previous requirement of separate forms for each shipment, and thereby to facilitate increased peaceful commerce.

In announcing the action, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks said:

<sup>1</sup> For detailed announcement, see *Bureau of Foreign Commerce Current Export Bulletin* 763.

Today's simplification in licensing procedures in respect to the European Soviet bloc is designed to carry out the Government's objective, first announced by President Eisenhower at Geneva last July, "to create conditions which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world." This objective subsequently was advanced at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva last October when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles indicated the intention of the United States Government to simplify export control procedures on shipments of peaceful goods to the Soviet bloc.

The new arrangement will broaden opportunities for increased trade by providing U.S. exporters with a roster of peaceful goods which will not require the granting by the Commerce Department of individual, specific licenses for shipment to the Soviet bloc.

It should be noted that our ban on strategic exports continues and that U.S.-origin commodities not on the new general license roster will continue to require individual licenses for shipment to the U.S.S.R. or its satellites and may not be reexported to Communist-controlled areas without clearance from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Also, the total embargo against all shipments to Communist China and North Korea remains unchanged. All shipments to the Communist-controlled areas of Viet-Nam and Laos, as well as the maritime provinces of the U.S.S.R., continue to require individual export licenses.

Included in the new general license list are selected items in the following categories: beverages, rubber products, drugs and pharmaceuticals, fibers, wood, paper products, glass, clay products, cutlery, hardware, cork, electrical household appliances, commercial refrigerating equipment, office machines, dyes, leather, hides and skins, pigments, paints, chemical specialties, soil improvement compounds, soap and toiletries, photographic equipment, plumbing fixtures, optical goods, musical instruments, toys, dental equipment, jewelry, lamps, sponges, notions, beauty and barber supplies, and shoe findings. The listed items may be shipped under general license to the following destinations: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland and Danzig, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, except the maritime provinces (Far Eastern seaports) of the U.S.S.R.

A substantial increase in the volume of licensing to the Soviet bloc took place in the first quarter of 1956, according to statistics prepared for inclusion in a forthcoming report by Secretary Weeks on export control operations. Licenses granted for Soviet-bloc destinations totaled \$8,788,543 in the first quarter of 1956, compared with \$1,624,856 in the fourth quarter of 1955, and \$4,968,322 in the

initial quarter of 1955. The bulk of first-quarter 1956 licensing to the bloc consisted of agricultural products and equipment, which together accounted for \$7,294,844 of the total licensed.

Actual shipments, however, have not as yet reflected the increase in licensing. U.S. exports to the European Soviet bloc totaled \$1,151,000 in the fourth quarter of 1955, compared with \$1,051,000 shipped during the third quarter of 1955.

## The U.S. Stake in World Trade

*by Sinclair Weeks*

*Secretary of Commerce<sup>1</sup>*

Whenever I come to New Orleans I cannot help reflecting on the stroke of destiny which, in the early days of the Republic, brought New Orleans and the trans-Mississippi Valley into the United States.

But for a twist of fate on the international chessboard, but for Napoleon's colonial ambitions which made Louisiana French, but for those far-off European events which turned Napoleon's mind away from the New World, this great country as we know it today might never have been.

What good fortune it was for us to have had in Paris at the critical moment a skilled and courageous negotiator ready to strike, in his country's interest, while the iron was hot. And—if a New England Republican may make so bold as to praise a Southern Democrat—what a magnificent vision of the future moved Thomas Jefferson bravely to accept the challenge of the moment and lead our country toward its destiny.

This is your annual Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference, and as we gather here today I need not remind you that one of the principal functions of the Commerce Department is to foster, promote, and develop world trade. Presumably, this relationship is what prompted you to invite me.

It is stating the obvious to repeat that the

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 10 (Department of Commerce press release).

For the year 1955, U.S. exports to the bloc were valued at \$7,248,000, as compared with \$6,120,000 for 1954, and \$1,776,000 for 1953. The 1955 and 1954 totals included \$4,743,000 of food grains, insecticides, and drugs shipped to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany under the President's flood-relief program for the Danube basin. In 1947 and 1948, U.S. exports to the bloc were valued, respectively, at \$339,857,000 and \$123,241,000.

United States has a tremendous stake in world trade in economic terms as well as in security terms. Forty million acres of American farmland today find overseas markets for their products. Ten percent of U.S. manufactured goods are exported. Upwards of 4 million American workers and their families rely on foreign trade. On the import side, we must look abroad for many essentials, including manganese, chrome, and tin. Eighty percent of our newsprint, 100 percent of our industrial diamonds, 100 percent of our vital nickel supply must be imported. Food products too are important items in the import list. They include almost 100 percent of our coffee, tea, cocoa, and bananas.

The United States stake in exports continues unabated. For example, last year, without considering at all the impact of foreign aid, United States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide range of products, in the total amount of approximately \$10 billion. This, of course, reflects the fact that we can and do compete successfully in markets throughout the world.

But in this process American industries are confronted in many foreign markets with restrictions which continually limit the opportunities to sell their products. In the absence of such restrictions, which include, among other things, quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions—in other words, under conditions of normal commercial competition—American manufacturers

would have sold abroad even more than the \$10 billion figure just referred to. Our industries do not seek special governmental advantages in selling their products in foreign markets; they seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in foreign markets on the commercial merits of their products.

These are all among the factors which influence the dynamic foreign-trade policy of the President and his administration. Let me summarize the main elements of this program:

1. In accord with the terms of H. R. 1,<sup>2</sup> adopted last year, the reciprocal and modest reduction of unnecessary barriers to world trade and payments.

2. The creation of a healthy business climate for stimulating investment abroad, particularly in the less developed areas of the world.

3. The encouragement of tourism to enable the peoples of the world to get to know and understand each other better.

4. The participation by the Government and American businessmen in trade fairs throughout the free world to carry the message of the American way of life and the products of free enterprise to foreign shores.

One of the most useful devices we have found for carrying through this program is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

#### Objectives of GATT

What does the GATT stand for? The GATT—the largest and most comprehensive trade agreement in history—is an agreement among 35 nations reflecting principles which have for good reason been cardinal points of United States trade policy. The Department of Commerce plays an important role in the policy formulations of United States-GATT relations.

First of all, GATT contains for each member country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which that country agrees not to exceed in charging duties on imports from the remaining GATT countries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000 items, embracing a large share of world trade. The remainder of the agreement consists of a set of "general provisions" which each country agrees to observe in international trade. An important

purpose of these general rules, which restrain the use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and administrative procedures, is to insure that these devices will not be used to nullify the intended value for members of the tariff-rate agreements.

GATT objectives closely correspond to established principles of American commercial policy—principles which include the most-favored-nation treatment, for example, which the United States in its own interest has long urged upon other nations. Generally speaking, however, as far as GATT is concerned, it is better from every standpoint to have 35 nations join in one agreement than to have to go through the motions 35 separate times with 35 separate agreements finally arrived at. For example, Department mathematicians tell me that, if we had to negotiate entirely through bilateral agreements, it would require approximately 595 separate treaties.

The combination of such negotiations produces results not possible in a series of separate bilateral agreements and, to my mind, certainly makes it possible for the United States to obtain greater trade benefits than could otherwise be achieved.

#### The OTC

There is now pending before the Congress a bill (H. R. 5550) to authorize the President to accept United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC).<sup>3</sup> The main function of this organization would be to administer the GATT. In addition, it would provide a forum for discussion of other trade problems, with each government remaining entirely free to adopt or reject recommendations growing out of such discussion. It would also assemble and publish data on world trade.

The Department of Commerce has an important interest in OTC, and because of this I have carefully reviewed the proposal for it from every angle. Both as a member of the President's Cabinet and as a former manufacturer I earnestly hope that the Congress will approve this vital legislation promptly.

So long as it is the policy of this Government to carry on foreign trade under the aegis of recip-

<sup>3</sup>For a Department of State memorandum on legal aspects of the GATT and OTC, see *Cong. Rec.* of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 6088. See also *The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation*, Report of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, To Accompany H.R. 5550; H. Rept. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 18, 1956.

<sup>2</sup>Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955.



rocal trade agreements and to do it by the GATT process, I am convinced that the creation of the OTC will enable American industry and trade to derive additional and increased benefits from the GATT and the tariff concessions we have received. The agreement for the OTC has been so drafted that United States interests are fully safeguarded.<sup>4</sup> OTC would not be supranational. It could not change a single tariff rate. It could not impose new obligations on the United States without our consent.

This whole proposition is essentially very simple. The OTC would provide machinery to enable the GATT nations to do better those things which the GATT already provides for. It would not extend the GATT provisions to any additional aspects of trade, nor would the OTC take any new kinds of action on aspects already covered by GATT. The new machinery to administer GATT is designed solely to enable the member nations to take more promptly and more effectively those joint actions already provided for in GATT, with respect to those tariff and trade matters already covered by GATT.

GATT and OTC project into the international arena trade-policy objectives with which the United States has long been associated.

We cannot lose by cooperating with our friends in the trade area of our foreign relations, just as we cooperate with them in a variety of other directions. We cannot stand at arm's length from them in this field and hope to meet the unanimity of action which the Soviet Union and its satellites achieve by force and terror.

#### Trade Controls

When we speak of the Soviet bloc, it brings to mind the other and perhaps darker aspect of our foreign-trade policy—the use of controls by the United States and our friends to avoid a significant free-world contribution to the buildup of the Soviet war potential.

I hope we may some day see the kind of government and the kind of policy in the Soviet Union which would make it possible to bring that nation and its present satellites fully into the family of friendly nations. That day is not yet here, and until it arrives we cannot afford to lower our guard.

<sup>4</sup>For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

The destruction of the cult of Stalinism means only, perhaps, that a policy of naked aggression is being replaced by a more subtle and insidious effort to achieve world Communist domination through propaganda, infiltration, and economic penetration. The lures and enticements put out by the Communist leaders are devices to trap the unwary as the spider traps the fly. A true index of Soviet policy may lie in a statement reportedly made by Khrushchev last September as follows:

We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes as a means of promoting relations between our countries.

We do not, of course, want to reject out of hand such opportunities as may arise to reduce world tensions. We must ever be alert to carry forward the principles of peace and peaceful exchanges among nations which President Eisenhower has dedicated himself to achieve.

The problem of East-West trade—how, when, and to what extent it shall be carried on—becomes a complex issue of international relations. Individual transactions or groups of transactions must be viewed from the perspective of our total foreign and national security policy. The results should be of a kind which brings the greatest advantage and the greatest relative strength to the free world.

Perhaps a specific example of Soviet tactics may illustrate the problem. Last month (March 4) the newspapers reported that an American firm had made a licensing agreement to produce in the United States a Soviet-designed turbodrill for drilling oil and gas wells. This device was heralded as being much more efficient than American oil rigs and as a sign of Soviet willingness to exchange their technical advances with those of the United States.

Much less attention was given at first to the quid pro quo desired by the Russians from us, namely, the technological information needed for producing advanced types of boring bits for drilling wells.

From the Soviet point of view this type of "exchange" is designed to create the impression of a fair exchange, in contrast with earlier attempts at one-way acquisition of Western prototypes. But on closer examination—of the type which this Government always gives to such proposals—an appraisal must be made as to whether this exchange might not open the door for the

Soviets to the whole range of developments in American oil production technology. In this type of "exchange" would the Soviets stand to profit more, because of their state control over domestic technical data and because they might latch on to an industry in which they are, on balance, in an inferior position technologically?

Charting the right course in the deadly serious economic contest between East and West requires the greatest wisdom and ingenuity that our policy-makers can muster. From a national security standpoint, this whole business of East-West trade and trade restrictions has caused a great deal of misunderstanding not only here in the United States but among free-world countries as well.

#### **Investigation of East-West Trade**

I have recently done some testifying on East-West trade before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The committee was particularly interested in the revisions in East-West international trade controls which took place in 1954.

The hearings were heated. Aside from questioning the policy followed in 1954, the hearings involved issues relating to the constitutional separation of powers as between executive and legislative and to the conduct of affairs within the executive branch. I should like to discuss with you some of the points made in the hearings.<sup>5</sup>

First, I want to say that naturally the committee has every right to make such an investigation. In fact, I think it is completely appropriate that constant surveillance of the executive be maintained by Congress. But even here it has been difficult to prevent gross misunderstanding of the issues involved, of the policies which are maintained, and of the results achieved.

Secondly, I should make it absolutely clear that the inquiry had no relationship whatsoever to U.S. export controls on goods shipped from the United States. We have our own controls, and they were not in question. The committee was concerned solely with the products which our allies ship in East-West trade and with the voluntary multinational controls set up by our allies in agreement with us.

Controls maintained by the United States on shipments to the European Soviet bloc and Com-

munist China are stricter than those of our allies. We have an embargo on all exports to Communist China and North Korea.

No shipments can be made to the European Communist bloc from the United States without first obtaining an export license through the Department of Commerce. Such licenses are automatically denied on items which are in short supply in the United States or which are, generally speaking, of strategic nature. When items in either of these categories are exported to friendly foreign countries, determination is made in advance that transshipment to the Communists is not to be expected.

Shipments of peaceful goods to the European Soviet bloc are authorized through the granting of export licenses. Such trade is relatively small in volume, however.

I have mentioned earlier that other free-world countries working together and with us maintain similar restrictions on trade with the Soviets. Their restrictions are of a more liberal order, however, than are ours. Many items are thus shipped to the Russians from European countries which the United States would not itself ship to them. Some of these items are strategic in nature.

During its investigation the Senate committee has frequently referred to the difference in stringency between U.S. controls and multilateral controls over shipments to the Reds. The inference has been drawn from time to time that we are somehow to blame for the fact that the Communists have been able to obtain materials of strategic significance from others which they cannot buy from us.

When I appeared before the committee I made it clear that if I had my way all free-world countries would exercise the equivalent in restrictions over the sale of strategic goods to the Soviets as those maintained by the United States. I stated further that to the best of my knowledge this same position had been consistently maintained by every interested department in our Government.

I also reported, however, that no power on earth is available beyond the power of persuasion to control the economic activities of other nations. If I remember correctly, I cited to the committee by way of illustration the old adage, "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink."

Much as I believe that it is in the free-world interest to keep these controls strict, I think, how-

<sup>5</sup> For a statement made before the committee by Under Secretary Hoover, see *ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1956, p. 619.

ever, it must be recognized in all fairness that we cannot compare our situation in the United States to that of European countries without finding tremendous pressures there for different policies in terms of East-West trade.

### Modification of European Controls

Thus in August 1954 the multilateral controls maintained by European countries as a limitation upon exports to the Communist bloc were substantially modified. This modification resulted in a shortening of the list of items under multinational control.

What were some of the reasons which led to this modification?

It must be recognized that there are historic patterns and other factors affecting the East-West trade interests of European free-world countries which are far different from those which apply in the United States. For example, Department of Commerce statistics show that, while U.S. exports represent only approximately 3.5 percent of our gross national product, the United Kingdom relies upon exports for 15.6 percent of its G. N. P. The pressure for international trade in the United Kingdom is based on the long-established fact that without adequate trade Britain cannot survive, let alone maintain a decent standard of living or a satisfactory national defense.

Other European countries lean heavily upon foreign trade. Individual export items become vitally significant to the economic welfare of these countries and result in heavy pressures for trade expansion.

As an illustration, the shipment of 2,000 tons of soft unalloyed aluminum by Norway to the Soviet bloc was a required concession as a means of providing a market in the bloc for otherwise unsalable seafood products—a major export item. Denmark is called upon to sell butter abroad or suffer disastrous results in its domestic economy. But in order to sell its butter to the Soviets, Denmark is called upon to supply merchant ships. West Germany finds it difficult to become completely separated in an economic sense from East Germany.

Much of the story of the revisions of the controls in 1954, the reasons for them and the results, has been made available to the public in reports issued by Mr. Stassen, the Battle Act Administrator in 1954, and by myself. Additional information classified for reasons of national security has

been made available on this basis to six committees of the Congress and is being offered to the Investigations Subcommittee on the same basis.

Certain papers of a highly sensitive nature which cover intelligence information, matter relating to international negotiations, and internal working papers of the executive branch could not be furnished. To do so would reveal information classified for the purpose of withholding it from the Soviet bloc.

Now, I am sure that you will all agree with me that, insofar as possible, we should not give the Communists even a scrap of information which would be of significant value to them in the cold war, any more than we should let them have commodities of strategic significance.

If closely guarded information were to be publicized in open hearing, the entire proceedings could be observed by agents of hostile powers and the entire public record could be reported abroad by representatives of the Communist press. We do not want to bare to the Communist nations some of our secret knowledge of their needs and deficiencies and those of our allies and ourselves. We do not want to tell them our own strategic and short-supply reasons for control or decontrol.

In the general area of separation of powers let me cite in conclusion some chapter and verse on the reasons why the executive branch declines certain informational material to the Congress.

At every level of the executive branch of the Government, issues are vigorously debated, and it is only human nature that there will be sharp differences of opinion. The same thing I am sure happens in the executive sessions of congressional committees. It happens in the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Does the Congress or the Court offer such discussion to public scrutiny?

Among such operations are preliminary research, undigested data subject to later appraisal, early drafts of memoranda as yet unchecked for errors, incomplete surveys which give only a fractional part of the final report, and other initial thinking and recommendations which must later be revised and perfected or overruled because of new facts or circumstances. Revelation of such embryonic data ripped from context would give an utterly false picture of a situation.

All of us want the unbiased and candid advice of our staffs and subordinates. No organization, no government, no military commander could

operate efficiently if all the scraps of paper and advices and recommendations of staffs and subordinates were to be cast in the public view. If this were done, it would no longer be possible for those charged with action to obtain candid and energetic expressions of opinion at advisory levels in the Government. Rather it might create among subordinates a yes-man complex or a fear of standing by one's own sincere convictions.

It boils down to this: The position of the executive branch is:

1. that we have not withheld facts which could properly be released,
2. that in the national interest we have refused to disclose, except in executive session, certain secrets which potential enemies might use to injure the United States and our allies, and
3. we decline under any conditions to make available internal executive working papers.

So, although we have kept the Congress and the public informed, I have described both practical reasons and security reasons which made it impossible to comply with all of the demands of the Senate subcommittee.

Underlying this whole issue is the historic principle of the separation of powers in our Government, one of the constitutional foundation stones of this Republic.

From George Washington down to Dwight Eisenhower, Presidents have found it necessary, in obedience to their oaths of office, to maintain the proper constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches. In this way only—with vigorous forthright leadership—can our country go forward on the principles which made our Nation great and which today make it the hope and inspiration of the free world.

### **U.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany in Triangular Transaction**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on April 27 that it had arranged an \$8-million triangular transaction involving sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany will purchase from the United States \$7 million worth of coarse grains—corn, barley, grain sorghums, and oats—paying for them in deutschemarks. An additional \$1 million has been authorized for shipping costs.

The deutschemarks derived from the sale of the products in Germany will be deposited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to countries where the United States has defense or economic-assistance programs requiring goods available in Germany. When purchases of such goods in Germany are agreed upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-owned deutschemarks and the triangular transaction will be completed.

The trade with Germany was made under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section requires that at least \$300 million of the funds authorized for the mutual security program during the current fiscal year be used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual security purposes. To date this year, more than \$285 million of these commodities have been authorized by ICA to 20 countries.

### **U.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956 Emphasizes Rural Development**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on April 22 that the \$29.1 million in aid which the United States is providing to the Philippines during the 1956 fiscal year is being used in the following manner:

—\$4.2 million to support an expanded rural development program.

—\$7.6 million to import equipment and commodities needed for projects to expand and diversify the base of the Philippine economy—in particular, rural road construction (principally on the island of Mindanao), port and harbor improvements, rural health units, and water supply and land development projects.

—\$6.7 million, proceeds from the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities, which was loaned to the Philippine Government for relending through commercial banks to help expand small- and medium-size industries.

—\$5.9 million for technical cooperation, including the financing of contractual services of U.S. firms and universities for assistance in advancing public administration, education, agriculture, labor, and industry; training Filipino technicians in the U.S.; technical advisory services of U.S. Government personnel; and supplies and equip-



ment for demonstration and instruction in all major fields of activity.

—\$4.7 million to continue the military construction program begun in fiscal 1955 in connection with the reorganization of the Philippine Army.

Most of the U.S. assistance is in support of President Magsaysay's comprehensive economic development program, for which that country has budgeted \$79.5 million of its own funds this fiscal year to encourage industrialization under private business, to improve government services, and to expand transportation and communications facilities. The main emphasis, however, of joint U.S.-Philippine efforts is to improve the living conditions and earning capacity of the rural population, who make up 70 percent of the Philippines' total population of 22 million.

The United States has conducted an organized aid program in the Philippines since July 1950, following 5 years of cooperation in rehabilitating the war-damaged country. The 6-year nonmilitary aid total of over \$137 million has been more than matched by Philippine funds used in the same program. Each year the Philippine Government has taken over and assumed responsibility for the support and administration of an increasing number of projects initiated with the help of U.S. aid funds.

Here are some of the results since 1950 of this mutual undertaking:

**Public health.** New American drugs, scientific treatment, and hygiene are beginning to wipe out scourges—malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and others—which have plagued villagers for generations.

**Agriculture.** Philippine agricultural agents, whose organization has been patterned after the U.S. Agricultural Extension Service, are showing farmers how to increase crop yields through the use of better farming practices, implements, fertilizers, and plant varieties, so that food consumption can be increased.

**Education.** New and better schools, established with help from such American universities as Stanford, Cornell, and the University of Michigan, under Ica sponsorship, are giving young Filipinos an opportunity to obtain a better education.

**Industry.** In 1955, the rate of new industrial development doubled the 1954 rate largely as a result of U.S. technical assistance and U.S. loans.

## THE CONGRESS

### Proposed Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act

*Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

First of all, I wish to affirm my belief that revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is necessary and desirable in the interests of the United States. The present law contains inequities and imperfections. I concur wholly with the President that it is in our national interest to provide for increased immigration to our land and to do so under equitable laws.

Obviously, I do not mean to imply that the present law is all bad. As a matter of fact, the Departmental officers charged with responsibility for the application of this law advise me that, technically, it represents a vast improvement over the numerous statutes which governed prior to its enactment in 1952.

I believe, however, that much improvement is still possible. For that reason, I am here today to support the proposals which the President has made to the Congress and which are embodied in the bills which this subcommittee is considering.

Many of the items in these bills have to do with domestic subjects within the competence of the Attorney General. He has discussed the detailed provisions of the bills with the subcommittee. I desire to support his statement with, however, particular emphasis on the foreign policy aspect of the legislation.

There are three principal items in this category which I should like to discuss. One is the national-origins system of determining quotas. Another is the recommendation to forgive certain mortgaged quotas. The third is the proposal which would permit the waiving of the fingerprinting requirement for those who apply for non-immigrant visas.

The President has recommended, in view of our expanding economy and high standard of living, that we increase our quota immigration by ap-

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Apr. 25 (press release 213). For the President's message on immigration legislation, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 275.

proximately 65,000 numbers to a total of approximately 219,000 annually. I fully support the President's recommendations in this respect.

However, my primary concern as Secretary of State is that whatever overall quota is adopted by the Congress be apportioned equitably. Our quota restrictions should not discriminate among persons merely on the basis of their national origin, nor should the restrictions discriminate unfairly against any of the friendly nations which have an interest in common with us in the defense of the free world. The present system of determining quotas is offensive on both counts.

#### **Discrimination Under Present Quota System**

He would, indeed, be bold to the point of recklessness who would identify any national-origins group as unable to contribute to the vigor of our society. Yet in actual operation the national-origins system denies to many of our citizens privileges which are accorded to other citizens and, in fact, to some resident aliens. For example, any American citizen or any resident alien who has a brother born in England, or Germany, or Ireland, or any country having a current quota, may bring his brother to the United States without encountering any delay whatsoever. However, under the present law, an American citizen who has a brother born in Italy, or Spain, or Greece, or the Philippines, or in any of a score of other countries, may not bring his brother to this country as an immigrant except after a waiting period varying from many months to many years. In my opinion, the national-origins system, which draws a distinction between the blood of one person and the blood of another, cannot be reconciled with the fundamental concepts of our Declaration of Independence which, as Abraham Lincoln said, applied not only to this country but to all men and meant "that all should have an equal chance."

It is easy to understand, therefore, the depth of the resentment that is felt by many of our own citizens who are denied the opportunity to reunite their families in the United States. This feeling has its reflection overseas, particularly in those countries where many desire to become United States citizens, where honorable persons, willing and eager to make their home in the United States, know that they cannot do so except after a wait of many years, while other persons similarly situated but living in more favored countries, can

do so without delay. The impact of this situation is felt in our relationships with friendly nations every day. It is particularly awkward and difficult to explain when, year after year, large numbers of authorized quota numbers go unused and yet no relaxation is allowed in the limitations placed on immigration from those countries which most need our assistance in this regard, and which we desire to assist.

The problem which confronts us, therefore, is to find a method of distribution of our quota numbers which is more reasonable than the national-origins system. I realize the inherent difficulty in fairly apportioning quota numbers under an overall ceiling. Traditionally, and as a practical matter, this has been and continues to be a subject for congressional determination. Therefore, I fully support the recommendation that the Congress immediately appropriate sufficient funds to explore thoroughly this entire problem and to devise a system of quotas which is not tied to the discriminatory national-origins concept.

#### **Interim Measures**

However, I believe that the necessity for the alleviation of certain flagrant discriminations contained in the present system is pressing. I support the President's recommendations for interim measures which will alleviate as much as possible the inequities which the Department of State encounters in applying the provisions of the present law.

I believe that the method by which the President has computed, and suggested allocation of, the recommended ceiling of 219,000 is fair and reasonable. Under the President's proposed temporary system, no country will be allocated a smaller quota than it has under the present law and the inequity which results when large numbers of authorized quota numbers go unused will be corrected by the pooling of the unused numbers on an annual regional basis. If this system of pooling unused numbers is adopted, the large waiting lists of preference applicants, who have a priority that is largely theoretical under the present law, can be realistically attacked.

Another feature of the President's proposal on which I would comment is the recommendation for an allotment of 5,000 quota numbers annually to be placed in a special pool, without regard to national origins, to fulfill our needs for persons

having special skills who may be desirable refugees or escapees. The most practical method by which this Government is able presently to grant asylum to escapees is through the Refugee Relief Act. When that act expires, there will be no special method by which this Government can offer asylum to any of the desirable escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. We attach great importance to urgent action on this provision.

#### **Forgiving Certain Mortgaged Quotas**

Another item which the Department strongly supports is that recommendation which would forgive mortgages placed on certain quotas under the terms of previous legislation. It is damaging to our foreign relations, for example, that Greece—a NATO ally—has one-half of its annual quota of 308 mortgaged for the next 61 years.

#### **Fingerprinting Requirement**

Now a few words with respect to the waiver of the fingerprinting requirement. Our recommendation is based primarily on the fact that, in most friendly countries in Europe, citizens may not be fingerprinted until they have been convicted of a criminal offense. The idea, which has recently become acceptable in the United States, of the desirability of having one's fingerprints on file as a means of positive identification in case of a disaster, has not caught on outside of this country. Because the taking of fingerprints connotes suspicion of criminal activity in many countries, we find that in fact we are requiring our friends to provide us with a record which their own governments require only of convicted criminals. I think it is easy to perceive why to many visitors this is a distasteful requirement. It would facilitate not only the travel of these desirable visitors but the fostering of good relations between ourselves and friendly populations if the Congress would be willing to drop the mandatory aspects of this requirement which, as the Attorney General said, is not necessary to the safety or security of this country.

Incidentally, I might mention that our attitude in recommending a provision for waiver is not, by any means, based on the intransigence of the Soviet Union and its satellites with respect to this question.

I wish to say one final word about the Refugee Relief Program. I took great satisfaction last week, Mr. Chairman, in announcing the issuance

of the 100,000th visa under this program. We are now issuing visas at a rate of approximately 2,000 a week, and we can say with conviction that the available allotments of visas for most of the countries involved will be used before the act expires. During the early days of the program many critics made gloomy predictions that it would be a total failure, and indeed the task of accomplishment has not been easy. For this reason, I am particularly pleased by this tangible evidence that the act is being successfully administered to achieve the ends which were intended for it.

Nevertheless, we are still hampered by certain needless difficulties. As you know, the President made 10 proposals for amendment of the Refugee Relief Act during the last session.<sup>2</sup> Other constructive suggestions have since been made. The need for amendment becomes greater as the final date of the act approaches. I therefore urge in the strongest terms that the Congress give immediate attention to this matter.

### **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

#### **84th Congress, 2d Session**

Status of Forces Agreements. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 309 and similar measures providing for the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and certain other treaties and international agreements, or the withdrawal of the United States from such treaties and agreements, so that foreign countries will not have criminal jurisdiction over American armed forces personnel stationed within their boundaries. Part 2, January 31, February 1 and 2, 1956. 497 pp.

Cotton Imports, Exports, and Minimum Acreage Allotments. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Cotton of the House Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8658, 8659, 8322, and 8703, a bill to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended. February 6, 7, and 8, 1956. 302 pp.

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations: U.S. Information Agency. February 7-21, 1956. 400 pp.

Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President transmitting the report of the National Advisory Council on international monetary and financial problems, covering its operations from January 1 to June 30, 1955, pursuant to section 4 (b) (5) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. H. Doc. 336, February 10, 1956. 69 pp.

Engineering and Scientific Manpower in the United States, Western Europe and Soviet Russia. March 1956. Joint committee print. 85 pp.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 951.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During April 1956

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . .	New York . . . . .	Jan. 3-Apr. 3
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Feb. 7-Apr. 6
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York . . . . .	Feb. 21-Apr. 4
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 27-Apr. 18
8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wines . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	Mar. 21-Apr. 1
U.N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Mar. 29-Apr. 7
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London . . . . .	Apr. 3-7
ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	Apr. 3-24
Inter-Parliamentary Union: Executive Council . . . . .	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) . . . . .	Apr. 4-8
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 4-13
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 5-21
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Apr. 9-20
International Instrumentation-Automation Exhibition . . . . .	Oslo . . . . .	Apr. 9-22
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague . . . . .	Apr. 10-11
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	San José . . . . .	Apr. 10-14
International Sugar Council: 8th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 12-13
6th Inter-American Travel Congress . . . . .	San José . . . . .	Apr. 12-22
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Consultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Rome . . . . .	Apr. 16-30
U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session (reconvened) . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 16-25
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London . . . . .	Apr. 17-21
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 17-30
UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants . . . . .	Habana . . . . .	Apr. 18-27
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London . . . . .	Apr. 23-25
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Region IV (North and Central America).	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	Apr. 25-27
U.N. ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 25-27

#### In Session as of May 1, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Nov. 28-
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 18-
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (reconvened).	London . . . . .	Mar. 19-
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 16-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 17-
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations . . . . .	San Francisco, Minneapolis, Boston, Louisville, Ann Arbor, Washington.	Apr. 19-
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 21-
9th International Film Festival . . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	Apr. 23-
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session . . . . .	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima . . . . .	Apr. 23-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 25, 1956. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Africa and the Far East; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications); ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; CCIT, International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international télégraphique); WMO, World Meteorological Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conférence internationale des grands réseaux électriques; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; IBE, International Bureau of Education.



## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### In Session as of May 1, 1956—Continued

Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	San José . . . . .	Apr. 25-
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-
5th International Philatelic Exhibition (FIPEX) . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 28-
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	Apr. 30-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Apr. 30-

### Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1956

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 1-
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 3-
2d Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 3-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	May 3-
U.N. Exploratory Meeting on International Trade in Cocoa . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 3-
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 4-
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session . . . . .	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	May 4-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Governing Archeological Excavations.	Palermo (Italy) . . . . .	May 4-
U.N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York . . . . .	May 7-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York . . . . .	May 7-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 8-
9th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 8-
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 9-
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties: 12th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	May 14-
Inter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Salvador (Brazil) . . . . .	May 20-
4th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers . . . . .	Israel . . . . .	May 20-
WMO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons . . . . .	Payerne (Switzerland) . . . . .	May 20-
U.N. International Sugar Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 21-
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 23-
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting . . . . .	Cayenne (French Guiana) . . . . .	May 24-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 25-
WHO Executive Board: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
ILO Governing Body: 132d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
UNREF Executive Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
16th International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris . . . . .	May 30-
PAIGH Directing Council: 1st Meeting . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	May
Inter-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	June 1-
International Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris . . . . .	June 4-
PASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 5-
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	June 5-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	June 5-
International Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 7-
International Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna . . . . .	June 7-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	June 11-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11-
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	June 12-
International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 14-
5th World Power Conference . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 17-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18-
FAO Council: 24th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18-
ICAO Assembly: 10th Session . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	June 19-
5th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering . . . . .	Lisbon . . . . .	June 25-
FAO Meeting of Fish Processing Technologists . . . . .	Rotterdam . . . . .	June 25-
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 25-
U.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 26-
U.N. ECE Coal Utilization Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 29-
International Exposition of the Sea . . . . .	Marseille . . . . .	June
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 22d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 3-

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled May 1–July 31, 1956—Continued

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Tehran . . . . .	July 3–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 3d Session. . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	July 8–
19th International Conference on Public Education (Joint IBE/UNESCO).	Geneva . . . . .	July 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 44th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 11–
International Whaling Commission: 8th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 16–
International Congress on Housing and Town Planning . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	July 22–
International Association of Theoretical and Applied Limnology: 13th Congress.	Helsinki . . . . .	July 27–
20th International Physiological Congress . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	July 30–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 4th Meeting.	Bangkok . . . . .	July 30–
PAIGH Commission on Geography . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	July
South Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Community Development.	Hollandia (New Guinea) . . . . .	July
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July

## Teacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico

by Howard H. Russell

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, unique in many ways, serves as a cultural bridge between the United States and the other American Republics. United States foreign policy in this hemisphere, dedicated as it is to the development of a true partnership with the Republics to the south of us, must be based on mutual understanding and respect between our peoples. In carrying out its international educational exchange program, designed to increase such understanding, the Department of State has long been aware of the advantages which Puerto Rico offers as a midway point—a meeting ground for cross-cultural interpretation. Thus ways have constantly been sought to make use of Puerto Rico's excellent educational facilities and other resources of this progressive Commonwealth.

Recently Puerto Rico participated in the introduction of a new and highly successful exchange

project. A Teacher Development Workshop, the first to be conducted by the International Educational Exchange Service outside the continental United States, was held at the University of Puerto Rico from February 11 through 28, 1956. Initiation of the new project resulted, in part, from recommendations made by Vice President Nixon at the close of his visit to the Central American and Caribbean area a year ago.<sup>1</sup>

Fifty-five elementary and secondary school teachers and supervisors from the Central American and Caribbean area attended the Workshop, which was designed to provide:

(a) An understanding of the philosophy, principles, characteristics, and organization of education in the United States.

(b) Opportunity to observe and evaluate modern methods of instruction relevant to the philosophy and principles of education in the United States.

(c) Training in the preparation of inexpensive instructional materials for elementary, secondary, and vocational schools.

<sup>1</sup> For Mr. Nixon's report on his visit, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 587.

• Mr. Russell, author of the above article, is Deputy Director of the International Educational Exchange Service and represented the Department at the Teacher Development Workshop.

(d) Opportunities to visit schools of all types and observe the use of modern methods and techniques.

(e) Opportunities to visit commercial, industrial, and agricultural projects.

In planning the Workshop, the Department had the enthusiastic cooperation of Puerto Rican officials and of the United States Office of Education, which assists the International Educational Exchange Service in administering the teacher development program.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Arturo Morales Carrión, Under Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, gave full support to the project and arranged a program of entertainment and hospitality for the visiting educators. Dr. Oscar E. Porrata, Dean of the College of Education of the university, offered the services of the faculty of his school in planning and conducting the Workshop. The chancellor of the university, Jaime Benítez, made all facilities of the university available. Dr. José M. Gallardo served as coordinator of the Workshop. Throughout the entire program, other members of the staffs of the College of Education and of the Commonwealth's Department of Education gave assistance which contributed significantly to its success.

#### **Selection of Participants**

The Workshop was designed for school administrators and teachers in the fields of elementary, secondary, and vocational education. Selection of participants was conducted in accordance with the procedure used in selecting foreign grantees for the regular 6-month teacher development program. Since the Workshop was conducted in Spanish, however, a command of English—one of the requirements for grantees coming to the continental United States—was not necessary. Candidates were nominated by their respective Ministries of Education and selected by the Department on the basis of recommendations submitted by the various United States Embassies and the United States Office of Education.

Forty-seven grants were awarded to educators from Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador.

<sup>2</sup> Under the teacher development program, more than 300 foreign teachers and school administrators come to the continental United States each year for 6-month programs of specialized study and observation of educational methods.

dor. In addition, eight grantees from some of these same countries who were completing 6-month projects in the continental United States were awarded supplementary grants to enable them to attend the Workshop. These eight contributed to the success of the Workshop by sharing their recent experiences in the United States with their fellow participants.

At the opening ceremonies, Chancellor Jaime Benítez gave the official message of welcome, expressing the pleasure of the university at the opportunity presented by the Workshop to serve the cause of inter-American solidarity and cultural exchange. He described Puerto Rico as an area of rapid social change and discussed the role of the university and the educational system in meeting the challenge of modern life and their contribution to the evolution of Puerto Rican society. The State Department representative extended greetings to the participants on behalf of the Department and briefly discussed the importance attached to the Workshop by the International Educational Exchange Service.

#### **Education in U. S. Discussed**

During the following days the mornings were occupied by planning sessions devoted to discussion of the philosophy, characteristics, and organization of education in the United States. These discussions were led by educators selected for their specialized interest in, and knowledge of, the subjects treated. Dr. Theodore Brameld, visiting Professor of Education, and Professor Carmen Gómez Tejera conducted the session on the philosophy of education. A discussion of the organization and administration of education in the United States was led by Dean Porrata, who gave a historical summary, tracing the development of our system from its beginnings as a community enterprise, in contrast with other systems which have developed as a result of centralized State control, and by Professor Hermina Vázquez, who spoke on the present structure of the educational system.

One of the most stimulating plenary sessions was that dealing with the psychological basis of education. A team of psychologists under the leadership of Dr. Ramón Ramírez López made a brilliant presentation of the role psychology has played in education in the United States.

Two other sessions were devoted to the academic and vocational aspects of the curriculum. Discus-

sion of the academic curriculum was led by Dr. Aida A. Vergne, assisted by Professor Elroy Cintrón Medina, Principal of the University High School, and Mrs. Cecilia A. Olmeda, Principal of the University Elementary School. A team of specialists headed by Miss María S. Lacot guided the discussion of the vocational curriculum. Dr. Vergne also participated in a discussion of teacher training, which was the topic of the last planning session of the Workshop.

For the afternoon sessions, the participants were divided into three groups according to their interests: elementary, secondary, and vocational. The main objectives of these sessions were to observe and evaluate modern methods and techniques of the educational system of the mainland as adapted to conditions in the island and to train the participants in the preparation of inexpensive materials for instructional purposes at all levels. Elementary school teachers focused their attention in these sessions on language arts, arithmetic, science, social studies, and arts, music, and crafts. Secondary school teachers covered similar topics at their level. Those interested in vocational education directed their attention to industrial, trade, agricultural, and commercial education, industrial arts, and home economics. All of the sessions involved discussion of objectives as well as methods and techniques. Some methods classes at the university had prepared instructional kits which were then presented to the Workshop members by the future teachers of Puerto Rico.

Members of the Workshop also had a chance to see an exhibition of teaching aids, to attend educational films, and to discuss the teaching of English as a second language. English classes were offered for Workshop members interested in learning or improving their mastery of the language.

At one session Dr. Teófila Gamarra and Donald Keiller led a discussion on "The Role of Audio-Visual Aids in Learning." They considered the relation between good teaching and communication, and the effect of the new tools of learning on the curriculum. The discussion developed the idea that communication is the basis of all teaching and that instructors should avail themselves of all media which will strengthen and add meaning to the bonds of communication. The other topic of discussion was the preparation of low-cost materials. The criteria for the selection of material, the principles for effective use, and the

techniques for effective presentation were considered.

One day was given over to visiting eight public schools in the metropolitan area. On another occasion the group visited public schools in the Caguas district, where they saw urban and rural schools in operation. The visitors were favorably impressed with the Puerto Rico Second Unit Rural School, whose curriculum includes vocational agriculture for the boys and home economics for the girls. These rural schools have always emphasized community cooperation and are an important factor in the improvement of rural life. The visits enabled the group to see how teachers in Puerto Rico use modern methods and techniques in their daily tasks. They were especially impressed by the effective way in which the Commonwealth has adapted educational principles and practices of the mainland to the needs of the island. They observed the informality of the student-teacher relation and the active role played by the pupil. Many noted the spirit of teamwork in the schools and expressed their conviction that Puerto Rico had evolved a dynamic school system which offered many possibilities for further adaptation in other Latin American areas.

Many of the participants who were interested in the industrialization program of Puerto Rico utilized free time to visit industrial areas. The feeling was expressed that it is impossible to undertake such a program of industrialization successfully without a solid educational basis. The tours outside the metropolitan area afforded an opportunity to observe the agricultural development of Puerto Rico and to note the modern methods and techniques applied in the sugarcane fields, dairy farms, and pineapple plantations.

There was time, too, for many of the teachers to visit agencies in which they had special interest, such as the Department of Public Instruction, Social Programs Administration, Department of Health, Industrial Development Administration, etc. Some also visited the Puerto Rico Teachers Association, where they received information on the activities of that organization, e. g., its medical services, hospitalization plan, and credit cooperative.

The Workshop was brought to an end with a reception given by the university chapter of the Puerto Rico Teachers Association. After brief remarks by Dr. Thomas E. Cotner of the United



States Office of Education, Dean Porrata presented *certificados* to the teachers.

### Evaluation of Project

At the conclusion of the project participants wrote a brief evaluation of the Teacher Development Workshop. The general consensus was that they had achieved a better understanding of the educational system of the United States; that they had learned a great deal about modern methods, techniques, and procedures; that they had discovered many useful teaching aids and materials; and that they had observed the results of a dynamic philosophy of education in Puerto Rico. They agreed that Puerto Rico is an excellent field for training and observation and were enthusiastic about its hospitality.

The most frequently expressed criticism was that 2 weeks is not long enough for a workshop of this nature, which should last a minimum of 4 weeks to allow more time for tours to schools, factories, and other projects. Because of the time element, only 2 days had been allowed for this purpose. It was suggested that observation visits be made in small groups over a longer period. All the participants felt there should be more seminars of this nature and that some system of followup should be set up to keep in touch with the Workshop members and assist them in making the most effective use of what they had learned. Several delegations inquired into the possibility of having teams from the University of Puerto Rico sent to their countries to assist in workshops and other educational activities.

The Workshop is expected to have a far-reaching influence on seminars held in the various countries. The members of the Cuban delegation, for example, gathered materials to prepare for six "Little Workshops," which were held upon their return home. Other delegations requested materials for similar activities. The Cuban delegation is also writing a 50-page pamphlet on *The Educational Experience of Puerto Rico*, in which they show the application of the principles and practices of the educational system of the United States to the Cuban environment. This pamphlet will be distributed in other Latin American countries.

As significant as the professional results of the Workshop is the contribution which it made to the strengthening of inter-American solidarity. The

friendships that grew up, the spontaneous expressions of appreciation for the international educational exchange program, and the informality of all discussions and exchange of views evidenced the feelings of good will and cooperation that prevailed among the visitors and the staff. Again people of different cultures had added to their mutual understanding of each other's countries through working together on problems of common interest and concern. The visitors also took away with them a new conception of the relations existing between Puerto Rico and the United States. Letters received reflect admiration of the progress achieved by Puerto Rico and an interest in pursuing studies at the university there. The Workshop has illustrated once again the significant role Puerto Rico is playing as a meeting ground for the cultures of the Western Hemisphere in furtherance of our common goals.

It is evident that the Workshop not only succeeded in attaining its immediate objectives but also created widespread interest in increased participation in related educational exchange projects. In order to meet this growing interest the International Educational Exchange Service has made tentative plans for holding another workshop next year in Puerto Rico. This second workshop will probably be of longer duration, in accordance with recommendations made by the participants this year. Requests have been received, also, for sending abroad teams of educators from the University of Puerto Rico. These teams would meet with teachers and school administrators and conduct sessions similar to those held at the Workshop. The enthusiasm prompting these requests makes it clear that Puerto Rico will play an increasingly important role in the U. S. international educational exchange program.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### UNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 207) that the U.S. Government will be represented at a Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), scheduled to meet at Lima, Peru, April 23-May 5, 1956, by the following delegation:

Bess Goodykoontz, *Chairman*, Director, International Educational Relations, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

George Greco, *Chief*, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, Lima, Peru

Thomas A. Hart, *Chief*, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, La Paz, Bolivia

This conference, organized by UNESCO in collaboration with the Organization of American States and the Government of Peru, is being called for the purpose of studying the practical problems arising from the gradual application of free and compulsory education in the states and territories of the Latin American region, and of making recommendations that might serve as the basis for a plan of effective action. The work of the conference will be divided among three committees concerned with questions in the fields of administration and finance, curriculum, and the training and status of teachers.

This meeting of specialists will be immediately followed by a Second Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education. The last named meeting, convened by the Organization of American States, will meet at Lima from May 3 to 8, 1956, and will consider the technical conclusions reached by the participants of the UNESCO conference.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification given:* April 19, 1956.

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Senate advice and consent to ratification given:* April 19, 1956.

##### Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Senate advice and consent to ratification given:* April 19, 1956.

#### Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed at Bogotá April 30, 1948. Entered into force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.

*Ratification deposited:* Argentina, April 10, 1956.

#### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

*Notification by Belgium of extension to:* Belgian Congo and Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, March 19, 1956.

*Ratifications deposited:* Laos, March 28, 1956; Rumania (with a declaration), March 28, 1956.

#### Trade and Commerce

Protocol on terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.

*Notification of intention to apply concessions received:* Finland, April 10, 1956 (effective May 10, 1956).

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Sweden, April 10, 1956.

### BILATERAL

#### Colombia

Agreement for establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station on the island of San Andrés. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá February 6 and March 14, 1956. Enters into force on date a memorandum of arrangement is signed by the cooperating agencies of the two governments.

#### Germany

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington February 13, 1956.

*Entered into force:* April 23, 1956 (day each government received from the other a written notification that it had complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements).

#### Japan

Agreement providing for Japanese financial contributions for United States administrative and related expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1956 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 13, 1956. Entered into force April 13, 1956.

Agreement setting forth understandings with respect to the program of aircraft assembly or manufacture in Japan, pursuant to the agreement of June 3, 1955 (TIAS 3383). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 13, 1956. Entered into force April 13, 1956.

#### Union of South Africa

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of passport visas to nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of notes at Capetown March 28 and April 3, 1956. Entered into force May 1, 1956.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Press releases issued prior to April 23 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 200 of April 17 and 207 of April 21.

No.	Date	Subject
210	4/23	Dulles: "Developing NATO in Peace" (printed in issue of April 30).
†211	4/23	Delegation to Inter-American Cultural Council.
212	4/24	Dulles: news conference transcript.
213	4/25	Dulles: testimony on immigration policy.
†214	4/25	Robertson: Wilson Centennial Celebration.
*215	4/25	Nominations of Nufer, Lyon, Beaulac.
216	4/25	Dulles: American Society of International Law.
217	4/25	Note concerning Russian seamen.
*218	4/26	Sixth annual awards ceremony.
†219	4/26	Agreement with Germany on film tariffs.
220	4/26	Program for Goulart visit (rewrite).
†221	4/27	Wilcox: "The U.N. in the Mainstream of History."
†222	4/27	Dulles: awards ceremony.
†223	4/27	Nixon: awards ceremony.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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